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On the Robustness of Air Pollution Policy Cost-Benefit Analysis 
STEFAN ÅSTRÖM 
Department of Space, Earth and Environment 
Chalmers University of Technology 
Abstract 
In December 2013 the European Commission proposed an amendment of 
the National Emissions Ceilings Directive with new ambition levels for 
harmful emissions of SO2, NOx, NH3, PM2.5, and Non-Methane Volatile 
Organic Compounds. For the first time in European air pollution policy, the 
proposed ambition levels were based on the future cost efficient emission 
levels in the EU, as identified by using air pollution policy models based on 
the standard theories of welfare economics and environmental economics. 
However, it is not evident that the theory and methods used are robust 
enough for the results from such models to be converted to policy 
ambitions. For example, the models are limited by only considering a pre-
determined set of end-of-pipe solutions, and by requiring an economic 
valuation of avoided mortality. 
The purpose of the research presented in this thesis was to analyse the 
robustness of these models. The analysis used different analytical 
approaches. A cost-benefit analysis was used to identify net socioeconomic 
benefits of emission control in international shipping. A decomposition 
analysis was used to test if emission control contributes significantly to 
emission reductions. In addition, the thesis contains an initial robustness 
assessment of the foundations of the economic theory used in air pollution 
policy models.  
The results suggest that the robustness of current models would be increased 
by including options for emission control in international shipping. They 
also indicate that the current focus on end-of-pipe solutions for control of 
SO2 is sufficient for the analysis to be robust. Finally, there are observations 
and analyses that contradict parts of standard welfare economics and 
environmental economics but it is yet unclear what these contradictions 
imply for the robustness of air pollution policy models.     
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Sammanfattning 
I december 2013 föreslog EU-kommissionen att utsläppstaksdirektivet 
skulle förnyas med nya utsläppsmål för skadliga utsläpp av SO2, NOx, NH3, 
PM2.5 och flyktiga organiska föroreningar. För första gången i Europeisk 
luftföroreningspolicy baserades de föreslagna utsläppsmålen på den 
beräknade framtida kostnadseffektiva utsläppsnivån i EU, identifierad 
genom användning av policy-modeller baserade på ekonomisk standardteori 
och miljöekonomi. Emellertid är det inte uppenbart att de teorier och 
metoder som använts är tillräckligt robusta för att resultaten från dessa 
modeller skall kunna omvandlas direkt till policyförslag. Till exempel så är 
modellerna begränsade genom att endast beakta befintliga tekniker för 
direkt utsläppsrening, och genom att kräva att man sätter ett ekonomiskt 
värde på mortalitet. 
Syftet med den forskning som redovisas i denna avhandling var att 
analysera hur robusta dessa modeller är. Analysen använde olika metoder. 
En kostnads-nyttoanalys användes för att identifiera socioekonomisk nytta 
av kontroll av utsläpp från internationell sjöfart. En dekompositionsanalys 
användes för att testa om direkt utsläppskontroll ger ett signifikant bidrag 
till utsläppsminskningar. Vidare innehåller avhandlingen en initial 
bedömning av robustheten i den ekonomiska grundteorin som används i 
policy-modeller för analys av luftföroreningspolicy.   
Resultaten tyder på att resultaten från nuvarande modeller skulle bli mer 
robusta genom att även beakta kontroll av utsläpp från internationell sjöfart. 
De indikerar även att nuvarande fokus på endast direkt utsläppskontroll av 
SO2 är tillräckligt för att analysen skall vara robust. Slutligen, det finns 
observationer och analyser som motsäger delar av den ekonomiska 
standardteorin och miljöekonomi men det är ännu oklart vad dessa 
motsägelser innebär för robustheten i resultat från policy-modeller för 
analys av luftföroreningspolicy.  
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Glossary of abbreviations used in this thesis, and their 
meaning 
Abbreviation Meaning in this thesis 
ARP Alpha RiskPoll  
BC Black Carbon (sometimes referred to as soot, or elemental 
carbon), usually considered as a sub-element of PM2.5 
CAPP The EC proposal for a Clean Air Policy Package 
CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis 
CEA Cost Effectiveness Analysis 
CH4 Methane 
CLE Current Legislation 
CLRTAP Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
EC The European Commission 
EF Emission Factor, the amount of emissions that is being emitted 
due to the combustion of one unit fuel or due to the production 
of one unit product.  
EOP End-Of-Pipe (used to describe technologies that control 
emissions primarily through the use of exhaust gas cleaning) 
EU The European Union 
GAINS Greenhouse Gas - Air Pollution Interactions and Synergies 
GHG Greenhouse gases 
IAM Integrated Assessment Model. Air pollution IAMs differ in 
model setup from the climate IAMs 
IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
MTFR Maximum Technical Feasible Reduction 
NECA Nitrogen Emission Control Area 
NH3 Ammonia 
NMVOC Non-methane volatile organic compounds 
NOx Nitrogen oxides (NO and NO2) 
OC Organic Carbon, another sub-element of PM2.5 
PM2.5 Fine particulate matter with an aero-dynamic diameter smaller 
than 2.5 µm 
RAINS Regional Air Pollution Information and Simulation 
SO2  Sulphur dioxide 
TSAP Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution 
VOLY Value of Life Year Lost. The metric used to value changes in life 
expectancy due to exposure to air pollution. 
VSL Value of a Statistical Life. The metric used to value mortality 
rates affected by exposure to air pollution. 
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Glossary of terms used in this thesis, and their meaning 
Term Meaning in this thesis 
Acid deposition Deposition of acidic components caused by 
emissions of SO2, NOx, and NH3 
Air Convention The preferred abbreviation of the 1979 UNECE 
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution. Often also referred to as CLRTAP. 
Air pollution Used in this thesis as a summarizing term for 
emissions of SO2, NOx, NH3, NMVOC and PM2.5 
(and sub-fractions) 
Control costs In this thesis the term describes the costs for 
reducing air pollution emissions through the use of 
end-of-pipe technology, altered production 
technologies, or other means.  
Control option A specific mean (like EOP technology) available to 
reduce emissions 
Control solution The combination of options necessary to achieve a 
certain policy target. 
Cost effective (strategy) Used in this thesis to describe the option or group 
of options (strategy) that reaches a given emission 
target at the lowest possible cost.  
Cost efficient (solution) Used in this thesis to describe the air pollution 
emission level (solution)at which the marginal costs 
of reducing emissions further is equal to the 
marginal benefits of the further emission reduction. 
Eutrophying deposition Deposition of eutrophying components caused by 
emissions of NOx and NH3 
NEC directive EU National Emissions Ceilings Directive 
(Directive 2016/2284/EU on the reduction of 
national emissions of certain atmospheric 
pollutants, previously Directive 2001/81/EC) 
Net socio-economic benefits Used in this thesis to describe the total benefits 
minus the total costs associated with emission 
control. 
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1. Introduction 
Emissions of the air pollutants sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), ammonia (NH3), non-methane volatile organic compounds 
(NMVOC) and fine particulate matter with aerodynamic diameter <2.5µm 
(PM2.5) are together and separately causing problems with: human health, 
acidification, short term climate impacts, eutrophication, vegetation 
damages, and corrosion. Air pollution is still a concern in Europe and in 
North America, even though progress has been made. 
The World Health Organization (2014a, b) has identified that the largest 
health risk from environmental causes is mainly driven by human exposure 
to PM2.5 in air. PM2.5 in ambient air is mainly constituted of emissions of 
primary particles (PM2.5) as well as of secondary particles (ammonium 
nitrates & ammonium sulphates) formed in the atmosphere and composed 
from emitted gases such as NOx, SO2, and NH3. Exposure to PM2.5 is 
associated with premature mortality, heart- and lung-related diseases, and 
many other illnesses (Thurston, Kipen et al. 2017). In Europe 2012, 
~380 000 premature fatalities occurred due to PM2.5 in ambient air 
(Lelieveld, Evans et al. 2015). In Sweden the number of fatalities due to 
PM2.5 exposure is estimated to some 3500 in 2010 (Gustafsson, Forsberg et 
al. 2014). The latest projections are that air pollution still in 2030 will cause 
some 260 000 premature fatalities in Europe (Ågren 2016).  
SO2, NOx and NH3 emissions might when deposited increase forest soil and 
fresh water acidification. Sweden is one of the European countries that still 
suffer from acidification damages. Although recovery is ongoing, 17% of 
the Swedish water catchment areas are exposed to acid deposition exceeding 
critical loads for acidification. These 17% are expected to decrease to 10% 
by 2030 (Fölster, Valinia et al. 2014). Reports are now showing biological 
recovery in European lakes and streams that were previously uninhabitable 
due to acidification (Garmo, Skjelkvåle et al. 2014). But still many 
European countries are projected to experience problems with acidification 
until at least 2030 (Amann, Borken-Kleefeld et al. 2014).  
Emissions of several air pollutants have also been identified to have short 
term impacts with large regional variation on climate change. Some 
pollutants, like SO2, cause cooling, while other cause warming. The air 
pollutant gaining most attention recently for its impact on climate change is 
black carbon (BC) which is usually considered a soot sub-fraction of PM2.5. 
BC emissions are considered to have a climate change potential ranging 
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between 120-3200 CO2eq, dependent on climate metric (Myhre, Shindell et 
al. 2013). Climate change impact has been identified for all of the above 
presented air pollutants as well as for the effect emissions of methane (CH4) 
have on ozone formation. Collectively, these are often termed short-lived 
climate pollutant (SLCP). Control of SLCP emissions have been shown to 
enable a reduction in the rate of global warming (Shindell, Kuylenstierna et 
al. 2012). 
In addition to the impacts on human health, acidification, and climate 
change mentioned above, emissions of the same air pollutants are also 
associated with several other types of environmental impacts. These will not 
be covered in detail here but includes eutrophication of soils and surface 
waters from emissions of NH3 and NOx, ozone damages to human health, 
crops, and ecosystems due to emissions of the ozone precursors NOx, 
NMVOC and CH4, as well as corrosion damages to buildings and materials 
caused by emissions of SO2 and ozone precursors. In Europe, the level of 
concern for these impacts varies. If considering eutrophication current 
trends and projections show remaining problems in large parts of Europe. 
The trend for ozone damages is less clear. Results indicate a mixed picture 
with decreasing peak level concentrations but increasing annual average 
concentrations. This mixed picture is thought to be due to European 
emission reductions of ozone precursors (lowering peak concentration) and 
increased inflow of ozone from other continents in combination with 
increased CH4 emissions (increasing average concentrations). Trends for 
corrosion damages show a steady decline over time (Maas and Grennfelt 
2016).  
Since emitted air pollutants have residence time ranging between days and 
weeks in the atmosphere and often travel across nation borders countries 
need to cooperate in order to effectively reduce negative impacts of air 
pollution. In Europe, the European Union (EU) thematic strategy on air 
pollution (TSAP) and the UNECE Convention on Long Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP or Air Convention) are the most 
important policy processes to deal with international agreements on air 
pollution. The Air Convention was signed in 1979 and have since then 
implemented eight protocols, out of which the revised ‘Multi-Pollutant, 
Multi-effect’ (Gothenburg) protocol is the most recent. This protocol sets 
country-specific 2020 emission targets for SO2, NOx, NH3, NMVOC, and 
PM2.5. The European Union started a bit later in their efforts to control air 
pollutants but has today the TSAP and several directives that in various 
ways regulate EU air quality, most recently the amendment to the National 
Emissions Ceilings (NEC) Directive (Official Journal of the European 
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Union 2016). The NEC Directive sets national emission targets for the EU 
member states and covers the same pollutants as the Gothenburg protocol 
but with 2030 as a target year.  
For years, the protocols and directives have been negotiated with influence 
from scientific measurements of air quality and environmental indicators as 
well as model analysis of emission dispersion and policy impact 
assessments, often under the auspices of the scientific centres of the Air 
Convention. For the negotiations of new ambition levels, policy impact 
assessments produced by scientific models have been, and are still, 
important. These assessments have most often been developed with air 
pollution Integrated Assessment Models (IAM), such as the UKIAM 
(Oxley, Apsimon et al. 2003), MERLIN (Reis, Nitter et al. 2003), and 
RAINS (Amann, Cofala et al. 2004). The RAINS model has later been 
converted to the GAINS model which in some modes includes greenhouse 
gas (GHG) control options (Amann, Bertok et al. 2011). Common for all 
models are that they identify future impacts on emission control costs as 
well as human health and environmental impacts from proposed policy 
targets.   
The latest European policy strategy proposal, the EC proposal for a Clean 
Air Policy Package (CAPP), used a new approach to identify an appropriate 
policy ambition level. Earlier policy proposals and impact assessments were 
based on ambition levels set by deciding which ambition level for 
environmental and human health status and control costs that were desired. 
Models were then used to analyse the impacts of the proposal, including 
which control options that should be used to ensure the cheapest available 
control solution (ensuring cost effectiveness). In the new approach a 
suitable ambition level was instead identified by using models to do a cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) of emission reductions and calculate a future cost-
efficient (and socio-economic desirable) level of emissions.  
Cost effective and cost-efficient are not two words for the same thing. In 
this thesis the terms ‘cost effective strategy’ and ‘cost efficient solution’ are 
used to help separate the concepts. In contrast to a cost effective strategy, 
which identifies the lowest cost to reach a given target, a cost-efficient 
solution identifies the human health and environmental level at which net 
socio-economic benefits are maximised. When emissions are at a cost-
efficient level the marginal costs of emission reduction are equal to the 
marginal benefits of emission reduction. This new approach to air pollution 
policy targets imply that the EC now assumes that it is possible to – with the 
help of models – identify a range for an optimal future air pollution 
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emission level. This assumption is made despite the fact that the scientific 
and policy community knows that there are many facts and aspects left 
outside the current economic analysis. In other words, in 2013 the EC 
shifted from using models to identify the costs for reaching a given target to 
using models for identification of the desirable target. In Figure 1 cost-
efficient emissions equals an ambition level of 76-92% closure of the gap 
between the 2025 emission levels in a current air pollution legislation (CLE) 
scenario and a scenario in which all available control technologies are used 
(MTFR).  
 
Figure 1: Marginal emission control costs and marginal health benefits in 2025 as 
estimated in the EC decision support material. Copied from Amann, Borken-Kleefeld et al. 
(2014) 
Prior to proposing CAPP on the 18
th
 December 2013, internal discussions at 
the EC had lowered the ambition level and the target year had been shifted 
to 2030, so the proposed 2030 target corresponded to a 67% closure of the 
2030 emission gap between CLE and MTFR. During the EU negotiations 
that followed at the EU council and parliament the policy process continued 
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to reduce the ambition level. In June 2016 the European Union agreed to 
amend the EU National Emissions Ceilings (NEC) Directive (proposed as a 
part of CAPP) so that human health impacts in 2030 from air pollution 
would become 50% of those in 2005. This corresponds to a 40% closure of 
the gap between CLE control and MTFR control in 2030 given that the 
objectives of the recently adopted EU climate and energy policy is achieved 
(54% closure if not considering the EU climate and energy policy).   
CBA is a criticised analytical tool (Ackerman and Heinzerling 2005, 
Ackerman, DeCanio et al. 2009), based on a criticised academic discipline 
(Schlefer 2012), and it can be questioned whether cost-efficient future 
emission levels as identified by CBA models are appropriate as basis for 
target setting in environmental policy. Even when accepting the current 
CBA concept there might still be approaches in the CBA models that are 
contentious, and new knowledge from other scientific disciplines that is not 
yet considered. If altering these approaches or adding this new information 
the policy message from CBA could change. For example, if considering 
new knowledge on the links between preterm mortality and exposure to NO2 
(Heroux, Anderson et al. 2015) the relative cost effectiveness of NOx 
emission control compared to PM2.5 control could increase, and the costs for 
reaching a given human health target would change. If so, this would 
thereby affect both the cost effective strategy as well as the cost efficient 
solution in CBA. Another example is if already considered health aspects 
(such as human health impacts from exposure to PM2.5) would be expanded 
to also include new knowledge on the types of health impacts from exposure 
to PM2.5 (Thurston, Kipen et al. 2017). Such a change could also alter the 
policy message from CBA models, but through shifting the cost efficient 
solution. The ranking of cost effective control options in the cost effective 
strategy would not necessarily change. The policy message might also 
change if expanding the number of control options considered in the CBA 
models. Currently, the CBA models include dedicated air pollution control 
options from land-based sources. However, there are other types of for 
example non-technical measures available in reality and international 
shipping is becoming a more important source of air pollution. Inclusion of 
new/more control options might change both which options that are 
considered cost effective as well as which solution that is considered cost 
efficient.  
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1.1. Aim and scope of this thesis 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine robustness of the results from 
current air pollution CBA models. This examination is done in two parts, 
one applied and one theoretical. The applied part examines robustness 
within the existing analytical approaches and draws on the results from the 
two appended papers (methods and findings presented in chapter 2-5).  
The hypothesis of relevance for this thesis explored with the research in 
paper I is that inclusion of more air pollution control options into the current 
air pollution CBA should motivate more stringent emission levels than what 
are currently considered as cost-efficient. Paper I thereby adds to with 
information on whether current air pollution CBA´s are robust with respect 
to the control options considered. Should analysis in support of policy 
consider more options than currently available in the model databases? In 
paper I we analyse costs and benefits of reducing NOx emissions from 
international shipping, an emission source currently excluded from the 
current EU air pollution CBA. 
The hypothesis supporting paper II is that air pollution CBA´s that only 
consider dedicated air pollution control (as is currently the case) severely 
underestimates the potential for emission reductions. A question related to 
the robustness of air pollution CBA and partly answered by paper II is: Can 
it be deemed sufficient to base policy proposals on models that only 
consider dedicated air pollution control as solution to air pollution 
problems? In paper II we decompose Swedish SO2 emission reductions 
1990-2012 and identify to what extent it can be claimed that dedicated SO2 
emission control options and dedicated SO2 policy instruments have 
contributed to emission reductions.  
The theoretical part discusses the robustness of the foundations of CBA. It 
is based on a separate overview of economic and CBA concepts that might 
affect CBA results (chapter 6). I present an overview of the setting of 
standard welfare economics and CBA´s as well as common discussion and 
critiques towards some of the assumptions in welfare economics and in 
CBA. I use this overview of welfare economics and the discussion around it 
as basis for an initial assessment of the robustness of the economic theory 
supporting air pollution CBA models.  
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2. Overview of the literature related to paper I and II 
Emissions of air pollution from international shipping were for many years 
regulated to a limited degree. But starting in 2007 emissions of SO2 became 
regulated through IMO regulations of the maximum allowed sulphur 
content in the fuel used. Since then the SO2 requirements have been 
strengthened two times and a third is expected by 2020. The regulations are 
driven by the use of Emission Control Areas, sea regions in which stricter 
control of emissions is implemented. The Baltic Sea and the North Sea are 
both emission control areas. NOx emissions from international shipping are 
controlled through technology standards which have not yet been ambitious 
if comparing to requirements on land-based sources. Consequently, NOx 
emissions from international shipping in European seas were for a while 
projected to become larger than land-based emissions (European 
Environment Agency 2013). To stop this trend, The Netherlands and 
Denmark as well as the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission 
(HELCOM) proposed to the IMO that the North Sea and the Baltic Sea 
should be designated as Nitrogen Emission Control Areas (NECA) 
requiring the strictest technical NOx emission control standards to be used 
on new vessels when sailing in these regions.  
The emissions, control costs and benefits of implementing a NECA in the 
Baltic and the North Sea and the English Channel have been partly studied 
earlier. Kalli, Jalkanen et al. (2013) analysed alternative emission scenarios 
following international regulations for both the Baltic and North Seas. They 
found that an implementation of NECA in 2016 would reduce Baltic and 
North Sea NOx emissions from 827 to 783 ktonne NOx in 2020 and from 
686 to 183 ktonne in 2040. A report version of the study by Kalli included a 
sensitivity analysis of an implementation of NECA by 2021, which would 
reduce NOx emissions in 2030 by ~25% (from ~830 to ~640 ktonne NOx in 
2030) (Kalli 2013). Campling, Janssen et al. (2013) analysed the cost 
efficiency of reducing SO2 and NOx emissions if a NECA would be 
implemented by 2016 and found that NOx emissions in 2030 could be 
reduced from 202 ktonne NOx in the Baltic Sea and 503 ktonne NOx in the 
North Sea to 108 and 269 ktonne respectively to an total annual cost of 268 
million euro/year (800 €/ton NOx abated). Jonson, Jalkanen et al. (2014) 
studied impacts of an implementation of NECA in 2016 on emissions and 
environmental and human health effects. They found that a NECA in the 
Baltic and North Seas would reduce emissions in 2030 from 293 ktonne 
NOx in the Baltic Sea and 642 ktonne in the North Sea to 217 ktonne and 
457 ktonne respectively. Finally, Hammingh, Holland et al. (2012) and the 
Danish Environmental Protection Agency (DEPA) (2012) together analysed 
emissions, control costs and the environmental and human health effects 
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and benefits of an implementation of a NECA by 2016 in the North Sea. 
2030 NOx emissions in the North Sea would as a consequence of NECA be 
reduced from 446 ktonne NOx to 317 ktonne. The total annual costs of 
reducing NOx emission would increase with 282 million euro in 2030. 
Furthermore, they found that benefits would exceed costs by a factor of 2 in 
2030 in the main estimates. We could not find any analysis on the net socio-
economic benefit of introducing a NECA in both sea regions. 
Evaluations of air pollution policies, such as SO2 instruments, are done with 
different methods. The most common methods are decomposition analysis, 
variations of panel data analysis, and case study analysis. In a 
decomposition analysis, changes in emission levels over time are 
decomposed into changes over time of the drivers of emissions. Examples 
of drivers are changes in energy demand, emission control technology use, 
or structural change (Hoekstra and van der Bergh 2003). Most national- and 
region-scale decomposition analyses are only loosely connected to 
individual policies. Examples are Fujii, Managi et al. (2013), Liu and Wang 
(2013) and Wei, Qiao et al. (2014) which all use different variations of 
decomposition analysis to identify the main drivers of SO2 emission 
reductions in China. Rafaj, Amann et al. (2014a) and Rafaj, Amann et al. 
(2014b) use decomposition analysis to identify the main drivers of (inter 
alia) SO2 emission reductions in Europe. Rafaj, Amann et al. (2014a) show 
that for EU15, reduced concentration of SO2 in flue gases (reduced emission 
factors, EF) were responsible for ~30% of the decoupling of emissions from 
economic growth and ~50 % of the emission reduction between 2000 and 
2010. The decomposition analyses that more directly try to link to 
individual policies are most often calculated only for one sector and with 
limited overview of other policies outside the policy studied, such as 
Hammar and Löfgren (2001), who study the impact of the Swedish sulphur 
tax on emissions and found that it caused around 59% of the reduction in 
SO2 emissions from oil use in manufacturing industries 1989-1995 (59% ≈ 1 
ktonne SO2). 
The other two methods are rarely used on a national scale and will hence be 
covered more briefly here. Panel data analysis typically identifies statistical 
correlations between emission levels and emission drivers. Examples are 
Millock and Nauges (2003, 2006) and Hammar and Löfgren (2010). These 
types of studies are often also sector-specific which prevents national 
upscaling of results. In a case study analysis, the drivers of emission levels 
can be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively and can be closely 
linked to individual policies (Lindmark and Bergquist 2008, Bergquist, 
Söderholm et al. 2013). The case study analysis also allows for site-specific 
and time-specific circumstances to be well represented, as in Bergquist, 
9 
 
Söderholm et al. (2013). Another variation of the case study is the policy-
directed case study, in which the case is the actual policy institution 
(Ellerman 2003, Schmalensee and Stavins 2013). As is the case with panel 
data analysis, the focus of the analysis on a particular sector or industry 
impedes upscaling of results to national impacts of an individual policy 
instrument. 
For the research questions in paper II we needed to complement the 
decomposition analysis since it doesn’t specify the causality between 
environmental policy instruments and the driving forces of emissions. In 
paper II we approached this gap through a qualitative assessment based on a 
literature overview and mass balance calculations.   
 
This overview indicated a lack of consensus about to what extent SO2 policy 
instruments have an impact on the driving forces of emissions. In our 
analysis these driving forces are: activity levels (fuel use & efficiency); 
activity shifts (fuel mix changes and changes in products); or emission 
factors.  
Some researchers states that SO2 policy instruments affect emission factors 
(Pock 2010, Andersen, Nilsen et al. 2011, Amann, Borken-Kleefeld et al. 
2014a). This view can be partly justified by the international policy 
processes which have focused on the use of Best Available Technologies 
(BAT), which implicitly promotes the use of end-of-pipe technologies that 
reduce emission factors (Byrne 2015). Other authors mention the possible 
but not certain impact of SO2 policy instrument on fuel-mix changes (Lee 
and Verma 2000). Earlier rules of thumb were that the capital cost of coal 
power plant could increase by 25-30% if flue gas desulphurization was 
added (Das 2006), and such large impact on capital costs could certainly 
have motivated changes in fuel-mixes from coal to fuels with lower sulphur. 
This rule of thumb can however be questioned by experiences from ex-post 
estimates of control costs, which have often showed that the actual 
abatement costs were lower than the anticipated (Oosterhuis, Monier et al. 
2006).  
 
Still other authors – while discussing environmental policies in general – 
stress the potential combined impact of policy instruments on fuel shifts, 
energy efficiency and end-of-pipe emission reductions (Kåberger, Holmberg 
et al. 1994, Xu and Masui 2009, Hammar and Löfgren 2010, Mansikkasalo, 
Michanek et al. 2011, Rødseth and Romstad 2013). Later analysis also 
indicates that even command and control instruments such as BAT should 
be considered to promote innovation and development of manufacturing 
processes (Lindmark and Bergquist 2008, Bergquist, Söderholm et al. 
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2013). Innovations in manufacturing processes can often decrease the 
emissions further than if only SO2 end-of-pipe criteria requirements are 
considered.  
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3. Background 
In the 1970´s acidification was recognized as a serious international and 
transboundary environmental problem which led to the adoption of the Air 
Convention. Over the years scientific progress helped shape the formulation 
of the protocols under the Air Convention and the most recent, the 
Gothenburg protocol, has an effect-based focus where future effects on the 
environment and human health as well as cost-optimal emission control 
strategies are identified through the use of models. Effect-based does in this 
context imply that policy objectives are set for human health and 
environmental impacts instead of setting objectives for emission levels. The 
EU efforts to reduce negative impacts of air pollution have developed on a 
similar path, although often focusing on controlling emissions from specific 
sectors or fuels. The newer directives, such as the 2001 National Emissions 
Ceilings (NEC) Directive (amended in 2016) and the 2008 Air Quality 
Directive, are effect-based and influenced by modelling of environmental 
and economic impacts of policy proposals. 
Emissions of air pollution often stem from the same sources as greenhouse 
gas emissions and there is thus physical as well as policy links between air 
pollution and climate change. These links are sometimes reinforcing (co-
beneficial) and sometimes antagonistic (causing trade-offs). One typical 
example of a co-benefit between air pollution and climate change is energy 
efficiency improvements that reduce emissions of both greenhouse gases 
and air pollutants, while a typical example of a trade-off is a policy that 
promotes the use of biofuels, which decrease GHG emissions while risk 
increasing emissions of some air pollutants. There is however today no 
international policy that takes an integrated approach and sets emission 
targets for both air pollutants and greenhouse gases. 
 
3.1. Science used in support of international air 
pollution policy 
Much air pollution research, and specifically policy impact assessments, can 
be classified as co-production of knowledge between science and policy 
(Dilling and Lemos 2011). Air pollution research and policy impact 
assessments have for decades been influenced by policy and vice versa, 
where the development of the critical loads concept, Integrated Assessment 
Models such as the GAINS model, as well as effect-based protocols are 
clear examples (Tuinstra, Hordijk et al. 1999, Tuinstra, Hordijk et al. 2006, 
Tuinstra 2007, Reis, Grennfelt et al. 2012).  
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Since the late 1980´s, policy impact assessments have focused on 
environmental and human health effects as well as emission control costs 
associated with lower emissions of air pollution (Hordijk and Amann 2007). 
The number of effects considered has followed the level of advancement in 
scientific knowledge and the possibility to produce simplified metrics and 
indicators. Through the development of the ‘critical load’ indicator 
(Hettelingh, Posch et al. 1995) the impact assessments can model potential 
effects on excessive acidification and eutrophication of ecosystems from 
reduced emission of air pollution. Through the indicators Phytotoxic Ozone 
Dose (POD) (Emberson, Ashmore et al. 2000), and the accumulated amount 
of ozone over the threshold value of 40 ppb (AOT40), the effect on ozone 
damages on vegetation could be assessed, and through progress in materials 
science links between corrosion damages and air pollution emission levels 
could be estimated (Tidblad, Grøntoft et al. 2014). In the late 1990´s and 
early 2000´s the epidemiological knowledge-base was advanced enough 
(Pope, Burnett et al. 2002) to allow for modelling of human health effects of 
air pollution. All of these indicators are enabled by regular monitoring of air 
quality (MSC-West, ccc et al. 2017), experiments and modelling of health 
and ecosystem impacts from air pollution (Lundbäck, Mills et al. 2009, CCE 
2016), as well as research coordination efforts mainly within the Air 
Convention (Reis, Grennfelt et al. 2012).  
Integrated analyses are necessary for policy impact assessments to cover the 
multiple effects and geographical differences of air pollution. It is also 
important to use scenario analysis since structural changes in the economy, 
changes in fuel use, and changes in industrial production all have impacts 
on emissions. To meet these demands, air pollution IAM´s have been 
developed. These models build upon the knowledge produced in other 
research fields, including the indicators presented above. The results from 
IAM specify which control options that should be used to control emissions 
and how large the control costs would be for a given target. The results are 
used to guide policy efforts directed towards international agreements and 
efforts in certain sectors. Examples of when IAM models have provided 
direct input to the policy processes are the Gothenburg protocol, (CLRTAP 
1999, Amann, Bertok et al. 2011), the European Commission proposal for 
CAPP (European Commission 2013), and the EU Greenhouse Gas effort 
sharing decisions (AEA 2012).   
Through the progress of the environmental economics discipline, also 
economic evaluation of air pollution impacts has been made possible. 
Consequently, also CBA has been used for air pollution policy impact 
assessments. The decision support material to the Gothenburg protocol as 
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well as the EU Clean Air For Europe (CAFE) programme both used CBA as 
complementary analysis to verify that proposed ambition levels could be 
justified from a socio-economic perspective (Holland, Forster et al. 1999, 
Holland, Watkiss et al. 2005).  
The IAM and CBA models used by the Air Convention and within the EU 
are regularly reviewed with the last major review taking place in 2004-2005 
(Grennfelt, Woodfield et al. 2004, Krupnick, Ostro et al. 2005), a smaller 
internet consultation taking place in 2008, and a review of the 
epidemiological evidence of health impacts from air pollution in 2013 
(WHO 2013a, b).  
The policy process partly constrains air pollution policy impact assessments. 
One such example on how air pollution policy impact assessments adapts to 
policy realities is through the choice of approaches and methods as well as 
system boundaries in the analysis. As an example, the air pollution policy 
impact assessment to the CAPP excluded GHG options that also reduce air 
pollution from the analysis. This choice of system boundary can be 
defended by the fact that responsibility for climate policy and air pollution 
policy in the EU is split between the Directorate-General for Climate (DG-
CLIMA) and the Directorate-General for Environment (DG-ENV). DG-
ENV cannot propose further GHG control to the EU member states in a 
process outside the ongoing EU climate policy process. Another constraint 
is that air pollution policy impact assessments strives to be acceptable to 
many different types of stakeholders in addition to scientific peers. This 
implies that state-of-the-art theories, if opaque to laymen, are avoided. But it 
also implies that black box models are avoided and open access to models 
and data is promoted.  
3.1.1. The most pertinent scientific approaches used 
to guide air pollution policy  
The multi-pollutant, multi-effect approach 
The multi-pollutant, multi-effect (MPME) approach ensures that known 
impacts of air pollutants and their interactions in the atmosphere and the 
environment is taken into account in analyses. This approach is necessary 
since several air pollutants affect several impacts, as indicated in Table 1 
which describes which connections between air pollution, human health, 
and environmental impacts that were considered in the GAINS model in 
2011 (Amann, Bertok et al. 2011). The approach is also important since 
several pollutants interact in the atmosphere, including the formation of 
secondary PM2.5 from SO2, NOx, and NH3 as well as the formation of 
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tropospheric ozone through reactions between NOx and NMVOC & CH4. 
The MPME approach thereby emphasise some of the system aspects of air 
pollution policy. 
Table 1: The multi-pollutant/multi-effect approach of the GAINS model (open circles 
indicate linkages that in 2011 were not yet considered in GAINS). Copied from (Amann, 
Bertok et al. 2011) 
 
 
The impact pathway approach 
The IPA (Bickel and Friedrich 2005) builds upon the MPME approach and 
describes the currently considered appropriate steps of air pollution policy 
analysis. These steps include modelling of emissions, emission dispersion, 
environmental & human health impacts, as well as the economic modelling 
of emission control costs and corresponding economic benefits. It extends 
the MPME approach by highlighting that air pollution policy also needs to 
adapt to regional circumstances since population densities and 
demographics varies over Europe and since the ecosystems of Europe are 
varying with respect to their sensitivity to deposition of acidifying pollution, 
eutrophying deposition, and ozone damages. Furthermore, since air 
pollutants are transported over country borders, and European winds have a 
general annual average direction, it is also important to know where a 
potential emission reduction should take place. The impact pathway 
approach takes all these matters into account and is used as a guidebook for 
the key analytical steps when doing air pollution policy analysis. An 
important concept formalised within the IPA is the use of dose-response 
functions and concentration-response functions. These functions describe in 
a formalised way the relation between air pollution levels and the impacts 
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on human health and the environment. These functions require input from 
topic-specific research and are key to analyse the impact of emission 
changes in policy impact assessments. The ambition level of the analysis 
sets the boundaries for how meticulous the IPA is done. IPA can use either 
coupled single-disciplinary models for each step of the analysis or with the 
use of IAM (CEA) and CBA. CBA will be presented in Chapter 0.  
 
Figure 2: The principal steps of an impact pathway analysis, for the example of air 
pollution. Adapted from Bickel and Friedrich (2005) 
Air pollution integrated assessment modelling 
The air pollution IAM that will be discussed in this thesis is the Greenhouse 
Gas - Air Pollution Interactions and Synergies (GAINS) model, developed 
by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
(Amann, Bertok et al. 2011, Kiesewetter, Borken-Kleefeld et al. 2014, 
Kiesewetter, Borken-Kleefeld et al. 2015). The GAINS model is developed 
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in many different versions, but the version discussed in this thesis is the 
European version focusing on control of air pollutants only. 
The GAINS model is a bottom up IAM developed to analyse how future air 
pollution emissions can be reduced to achieve biggest possible positive 
impacts on the environment and human health to the lowest cost. The model 
integrates: exogenous scenario data on polluting activities; database 
information on emission factors and emission control costs; linear form 
calculations of emission dispersion and deposition over Europe; exogenous 
data on ecosystem sensitivities and on population demographics; to 
calculate scenario-specific results on emissions, emission control costs, as 
well as environmental and human health impacts.  
A number of disciplinary models and research feeds in to the GAINS model 
(Figure 3). Exogenous data on polluting activities is taken either from 
European scale energy system models and agricultural models such as 
POLES, CAPRI, and PRIMES (Russ, Ciscar et al. 2009, Britz and Witzke 
2014, NTUA 2014), or from national data supplied by national experts. The 
linear form calculations of emission dispersion is based on calculations with 
the chemical transport model EMEP (Simpson, Benedictow et al. 2012) and 
the exogenous data on ecosystem sensitivities is provided by the Co-
ordination Centre for Effects (CCE) of the Air Convention (Posch, 
Slootweg et al. 2012).  
To achieve a result with biggest possible positive impact on human health 
and the environment to the lowest cost the GAINS model minimizes costs 
for a given policy target. In that respect the GAINS model is used for cost 
effectiveness analysis (CEA). 
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Figure 3: The data and information flow chart for the control cost optimization of the 
GAINS model. Copied from Amann, Cofala et al. (2004) 
 
Cost effectiveness analysis 
CEA is used to identify which control options to use so that a desired target 
can be met at lowest control cost. Dependent on the model approach used, 
cost effectiveness can be analysed with different money metrics. In the 
context of air pollution control costs are expressed as costs associated with 
the purchase and use of technology, including costs for additional material, 
waste handling, and sometimes income from by-products. Through 
inventories of available control options and their control costs these can 
then be ranked according to their costs so that a cost minimal control 
strategy can be identified for a given policy target. With the GAINS model, 
this cost minimal strategy is identified through linear optimization applied 
to the model setting described above. In short, the minimization uses a 
policy target on environmental and human health as optimization constraint 
and then finds the cost minimal solution to reaching that target by varying 
the use of the available control options. The policy target is based on the 
gap closure technique by first identifying a baseline emission level and use 
of control technologies followed by an identification of a maximum 
technical feasible emission reduction level and corresponding use of control 
technologies (given application constraints). The policy targets are then 
introduced as a specification on how much of the gap between the baseline 
and the maximum that should be closed (Wagner, Heyes et al. 2013).   
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3.2. Air pollution and climate change 
There are close links between anthropogenic air pollution emissions and 
emissions of greenhouse gases such as CO2 and CH4, the two greenhouse 
gases with highest impact on global warming today (Myhre, Shindell et al. 
2013). Combustion of fuel is a main driver of both air pollution and CO2 
emissions, and agricultural activities such as meat production and manure 
management drives emissions of both NH3 and CH4. The relationship 
between air pollution and climate change can be co-beneficial but also of 
opposing nature. This is a concern both for physical impacts as well as for 
impacts from policy initiatives to curb either air pollution or climate change. 
3.2.1. Physical interactions between air pollution and 
climate change 
Although the sources of emissions are largely the same, the climate change 
and air pollution impacts differ in a couple of ways. The residence time in 
the atmosphere from emitted air pollutants usually range between days and 
weeks, while emissions of CH4 has a residence time of roughly a decade and 
CO2 atmospheric adjustment time of hundreds of years. Also the impacts 
differ in terms of time scales. Some air pollution impacts are caused by 
short term exposure (like acute ozone exposure), and some have an impact 
that ranges decades (like long-term exposure to PM2.5 and acidification). 
Climate change impacts act on a much longer time scale and through inertia 
in the global heat circulation system the impacts can last for centuries and 
more. Closely linked to this difference in time scales are the geographical 
ranges of the impacts. In general, shorter adjustment time scales implies 
smaller regional impacts. Air pollution is mainly a local (cities/countries) 
and regional (continents) problem (although shared by all populated regions 
of the world), while problems caused by CO2 and CH4 are global. 
What complicates the matter is that many air pollutants (mainly SO2, NOx, 
PM-fractions, NMVOC) have warming or cooling properties and thereby 
impact on climate change (Myhre, Shindell et al. 2013). It is mainly sulphur 
aerosols and fine particulate matter that cause cooling, while some sub-
fractions of fine particular matter (BC) as well as tropospheric ozone 
(affected by emissions of NOx, NMVOC, and CH4) is associated with 
warming. The knowledge about air pollution impacts on climate change is 
incomplete (Myhre and Samset 2015), impacts have a regional nature 
(Aamaas, Berntsen et al. 2016), and the climate impacts might be located in 
other regions than the emission source region (Acosta Navarro, Varma et al. 
2016). 
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One example is the atmospheric brown clouds containing aerosols that have 
been found to mask the global warming caused by greenhouse gas 
emissions, but can have both warming and cooling regional impacts, 
sometimes of larger magnitude than for that of greenhouse gases 
(Ramanathan and Feng 2009). Conversely, climate change is anticipated to 
bring about warmer temperatures and changes in precipitation patterns. This 
might increase tropospheric ozone concentrations in some regions and also 
change PM2.5 concentrations in many regions (likely increasing 
concentrations in some regions and decreasing in other regions) (von 
Schneidemesser and Monks 2013). On a global scale, todays’ concentration 
of aerosols (including sulphur compounds) currently counteracts (masks) 
global warming to an extent corresponding to a radiative forcing (RF) of -
0.9 watt / m
2
 (CO2 concentrations cause global warming with an RF of 
~1.82 watt / m
2
). In contrast, emissions that act as ozone precursors cause an 
RF of 0.5 watt/m
2
. The global average does however hide large regional 
variation, and the impact of the aerosol components vary (Myhre, Shindell 
et al. 2013). As an example, Bond, Doherty et al. (2013) find that the direct 
RF of BC is +0.9 W/m
2
, with indirect effects adding more unquantified 
warming. Again it needs to be stressed that the knowledge is incomplete and 
the values presented above might be updated.    
3.2.2. Interactions between air pollution policies and 
climate policies 
Policies used to control air pollution and climate change implies co-benefits 
or trade-offs on costs for the economy, as well as on emissions and impacts 
(Apsimon, Amann et al. 2009). Most available knowledge relate to how 
climate policies affect air pollution policies. Generally, climate policies are 
found to be co-beneficial for air pollution, but the size of the co-benefit is 
largely dependent on the climate policy strategy chosen and how ambitious 
it is. Studies of co-benefits have also shown that implementation of climate 
policy alone doesn’t lead to achievement of current air pollution policy 
targets (van Harmelen, Bakker et al. 2002, Rafaj, Schoepp et al. 2013, 
IIASA 2014).   
Earlier studies showed that an expected implementation of the Kyoto 
protocol in the EU could enable economic co-benefits between air pollution 
control and GHG emission control by 2010. The size of the economic co-
benefit is mainly based on the assumed policy mechanisms. If analysed as 
separate policies, the reduced costs for air pollution control would amount 
to 10-20% of total GHG control costs (Syri, Amann et al. 2001). When 
analysed as integrated policies, the air pollution control costs could be 
reduced by an amount corresponding to roughly half of the costs for 
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achieving the Kyoto target (van Vuuren, Cofala et al. 2006). Newer studies, 
analysing economic co-benefits in 2030, also find economic co-benefits of 
integrating air pollution and climate change policies (McCollum, Krey et al. 
2013, Rafaj, Schoepp et al. 2013).        
It is not only integration of air pollution and climate policies that are 
important for economic co-benefits. Also the policy mechanisms used to 
implement climate policies determine the size of economic co-benefits. For 
example, analysis show that GHG emissions trading could to some extent 
reduce European co-benefits between GHG emission control and air 
pollution control  (Syri, Amann et al. 2001, van Vuuren, Cofala et al. 2006, 
Rypdal, Rive et al. 2007). 
By considering the potential for lowering air pollution emissions instead of 
minimizing air pollution control costs one can study co-benefits and trade-
offs on emissions and impacts between air pollution and climate policies. 
Such studies show that climate policies often lead to co-benefits on 
environmental and human health impacts due to reduced emissions of air 
pollutants. For example, if the EU were to strive for a 2 degree climate 
policy target, this would reduce human health impacts by some 70% 
compared to a no-climate scenario by 2050 (Schucht, Colette et al. 2015), or 
by some 35% compared to a Kyoto protocol baseline scenario (Rafaj, 
Schoepp et al. 2013). Other studies have shown that these types of co-
benefits continue to increase until at least 2100 (West, Smith et al. 2013).  
The economic and impact-related co-benefits presented above is enabled by 
the use of energy efficiency measures as well as fuel shifts from solid to 
liquid, gaseous, and renewable energy. In the long run, also carbon capture 
and storage may play a role. However, as was the case for economic co-
benefits, the climate policy mechanism will have an impact on the size of 
the co-benefits on emissions and impacts. Air pollution impacts are 
unevenly distributed geographically, and GHG emissions trading might 
reduce the co-benefits in Europe. Also, climate policy mechanisms that 
focus on bio-fuels are at risk of increasing problems with air pollution 
related human health and also increase warming in the short term through 
increased used of biofuels in small scale wood combustion which in turn 
increase emissions of short lived climate pollutants (Rafaj, Schoepp et al. 
2013, Åström, Tohka et al. 2013). 
In general, while energy efficiency improvements ensures co-benefits 
between air pollution and climate change, dedicated control of either air 
pollution or greenhouse gases can cause trade-offs between climate and air 
pollution objectives. Increased use of biofuels risk increasing emissions of 
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PM2.5, and certain air pollution control technologies are at risk of increasing 
(to a smaller extent) fuel demand and thereby CO2 emissions, such as 
advanced end-of-pipe control in passenger cars (Williams 2012, von 
Schneidemesser and Monks 2013). The use of diesel cars, implemented in 
an effort to increase fuel efficiency, is another important example of trade-
off between climate and air pollution since diesel cars up until 2017 have 
been allowed higher PM2.5 emissions per kilometre driven. Furthermore, 
diesel cars have in real life driving been shown to also have large problems 
achieving the allowed emission limits as compared to gasoline vehicles 
(Weiss, Bonnel et al. 2012).  
The close links between emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollutants 
has by the scientific community been brought forwards as a rationale for 
integrating climate and air pollution policy. However, one unexpected effect 
of these proposals is that they have been taken as an excuse for focusing the 
policy process entirely on GHG control. This was the case in the 
negotiations on the NEC directive in the early 2000 (which coincided with 
the Kyoto Protocol implementation negotiations), and during the first effort 
to review the NEC directive in 2005-2007 (which coincided with the EU-
negotiations for a Climate & Energy package). The same argument was 
used again in December 2014 when the European Commission suggested to 
modify the proposal for an amendment of the NEC directive with the 
motivation that the proposal was: “To be modified as part of the legislative 
follow-up to the 2030 Energy and Climate Package.” (European 
Commission 2014). In other words, the EC has in three cases appeared to 
consider dedicated air pollution policy as superfluous since efforts were 
made to control GHG emissions. This despite the fact that IIASA (2014) 
show that the latest EU climate & energy package (-40% GHG compared to 
1990, 27% renewable energy, 30% improvement of energy efficiency 
compared to a 2007 baseline projection) would decrease 2030 emissions of 
air pollutants with only 4-10% compared to the 2030 baseline. 
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4. Methods 
4.1. Cost-benefit analysis 
In the versions based on optimization, CBA focus on identifying what a 
policy target should be to give maximum benefit to society. CBA thereby 
identifies the cost-efficient solution as in contrast to the cost-effective 
strategy identified with CEA. In CBA it is presumed that the demand for 
environmental quality and human health is dependent on the cost of 
satisfying the demand and that each incremental improvement is worth less 
than the previous. If this is the case, there is a solution in which the 
marginal cost for achieving an incremental reduction in emission levels is 
equal to the marginal benefits of that incremental change. This resulting 
total emission level is then cost-efficient for society.  
CBA can also be used to identify which of the available options (or policies) 
that would give highest available net socio-economic benefits for society. 
The results from such a CBA show the ratio of benefit over costs (B/C 
ratio). If the B/C ratio is above one, the solution gives net socio-economic 
benefits. This latter version is useful if many control options are available to 
reach the same target or if the control options studied are non-additive. This 
type of CBA is the one used in Paper I. 
The CBA approach was developed in 19
th
 century France (Pearce 1998). 
Over the years, CBA practices have been developed by both applied and 
theoretical researchers. Many guidelines and books have been written on 
how to do a CBA. In a typical manual, a CBA should include the following 
steps (adapted from Boardman, Greenberg et al. (2001): 
 A specification of the alternatives to be evaluated,  
 A decision on whose benefits and costs that should be considered,  
 Identification of impacts and how to measure them,  
 Prediction of the quantitative change of the impacts,  
 Monetization of the changes,  
 Discounting of the monetized values if they occur over a period of 
time and not only in a single year,  
 Computing Net Present Value (NPV) of all the alternatives,  
 Sensitivity analysis,  
 Recommendation on policy action: 
The study-specific monetization of the changes is usually prohibitively 
expensive to analyse and many environmental policy CBAs have come to 
rely on benefits being assessed with the benefit transfer method. Benefit 
transfer, ‘the use of existing information designed for one specific context to 
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address policy questions in another context' (Desvousges, Johnson et al. 
1998) basically implies that either the benefit values or the benefit function 
from an existing state-of-the-art economic valuation study is transferred to a 
study on other populations, geographical regions, or policies. The transfer of 
benefit values can be done through different level of sophistication where 
the least sophisticated – the direct transfer of values – has been shown to 
often be the least accurate. Preferably, the transfer of benefit values involves 
either adjustments for key economic parameters such as GDP per capita and 
purchase power parity, or studying the trends in values from different 
studies, or the use of value ranges from prior studies. Transferring benefit 
functions implies that explanatory variables observable in both the original 
study and the ongoing study are used to derive a function that explains the 
benefit value in the original study. The function is then transferred to the 
ongoing study and used to calculate new benefit values (Johnston, Rolfe et 
al. 2015). 
 
4.1.1. The CBA method used in paper I 
The CBA method used in paper I followed the impact pathway approach. 
Impact on emissions and control costs were calculated through the 
compilation of available data and scenarios on emission drivers, emission 
factors and through the use of technology-specific control cost calculations. 
Emission dispersion and human exposure calculations were calculated with 
the GAINS model and monetization of impacts were calculated with the 
Alpha Risk-Poll (ARP) model (Schucht, Colette et al. 2015).  
There are a couple of ways in which the method used in paper I differed 
from the analytical steps mentioned for a standard approach to CBA. It is 
not certain that all welfare-relevant economic values, such as existence 
values and bequest values (Ruijgrok 2004) were considered. With respect to 
monetization of mortality it appears as if only values related to ‘self-
sufficiency’ are included in the valuation studies such as Desaigues, Ami et 
al. (2011). Welfare issues like ‘concern for good air quality-related health of 
grand-children’ might thereby not be considered in the values used. 
Furthermore, with respect to benefit transfer it can be said that the CBA in 
paper I used unit value transfers for all European countries (although using 
value ranges when literature values were available). One implication is that 
all Europeans were considered of equal importance. Another implication is 
that it was assumed that values are equal at all air quality levels and 
variations of baseline life expectancies (which differ between countries). It 
should however be mentioned that Desaigues, Ami et al. (2011) present EU 
average values of avoided mortality. With respect to impacts on morbidity 
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the values used in ARP are derived from health care costs of treating the 
symptoms and are thereby missing even more welfare-relevant issues than 
the valuation of mortality. 
Instead of using discounting and calculation of net present values, the CBA 
in paper I calculated annual control costs and benefits and compared these 
for a target year. By doing so we avoided making a number of assumptions 
on the temporal distribution of costs and benefits but instead made the 
assumption that the temporal distribution of costs and benefits would be 
equally distributed over time. Since a zero discount rate was used and 
recommended for the benefit estimates of health impacts (Desaigues, Ami et 
al. 2011) we could avoid the analytical problem of the temporal distribution 
of health impacts due to reduced long term exposure to air pollution.  
With respect to sensitivity analysis it should be mentioned that control cost 
estimates in paper I used low, mid, high estimates from the literature. The 
benefit estimates were correspondingly varied following value ranges in the 
literature on mortality impacts of air pollution exposure. Only one estimate 
on population projections and central estimates from the literature on human 
health impacts were considered 
Although not necessarily a deviation from the standard CBA approach the 
choice of population considered in ARP is the populations in the countries 
affected by the policy proposal. Europeans’ potential consideration for 
‘good health for other European citizens’ might thereby not be considered. 
The valuation studies providing values to ARP does not seem to consider 
inter-generational or intra-generational justice. 
 
4.2. Decomposition analysis 
Decomposition analysis (Hoekstra and van der Bergh 2003) of emissions 
enables analysis of the relative importance of the driving forces behind 
emissions and their development over time. The method is considered 
suitable for analysis of how SO2 emission reductions are realised (De Bruyn 
1997, Stern 2002). Typically, in a decomposition analysis on emissions, 
chronological data of emission driving forces is collected and used to 
calculate a baseline emission scenario. Following this, all drivers but one 
are kept at the base year value and the emission scenario is recalculated. The 
impact of the driver kept constant is then identified through subtraction of 
emissions in the recalculated scenario from emissions in the baseline 
scenario. Re-analysis of historical data is the most common setting for 
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decomposition analysis, but there are examples of decomposition analysis 
done for future years (Rafaj, Amann et al. 2014). 
There are several different types of decomposition analysis. One proposed 
distinction is between structural decomposition analysis (SDA), using 
economic input-output data and index decomposition analysis (IDA), using 
for example energy statistics as data (Hoekstra and van der Bergh 2003). 
Usually the IDA requires more detailed data, and the driving forces included 
are often mainly those linked to the physical causality of emissions (fuel 
use, fuel emission factors etc.). In contrast the SDA through the use of 
input-output data can show the impact of indirect effects as well as demand 
effects on emissions. The calculations might be made through the use of 
econometric models (Stern 2002) or through the use of additive or 
multiplicative forms of IDA (Hammar and Löfgren 2001, Rafaj, Amann et 
al. 2014). In some cases the IDA is done purely on indexed values (Divisia 
index) which allows for comparisons of drivers with different units and not 
directly physically linked to emissions, such as fuel prices (Hoekstra and 
van der Bergh 2003, Fujii, Managi et al. 2013). In that respect the Divisia 
index approach can be seen as a middle step between IDA and SDA.  
Our decomposition analysis was based on Rafaj, Amann et al. (2014) and 
used detailed Swedish energy, industry, and SO2 emission statistics for 
1990-2012 to analyse the relative impacts on SO2 decoupling from 
economic growth from structural changes in the overall economy, Fuel use 
changes (changes in total fuel demand and fuel mixes), changes in industrial 
productivity, and emission factor changes.  
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5. Reflections on our results from paper I and II  
5.1. Main results 
The following conclusions can be drawn from Paper I. 
A NECA in both the Baltic and North Seas would give net socio-economic 
benefits 
The results from our analysis are that the 2030 annual control costs would 
be exceeded by the annual benefits of reduced air pollution problems if a 
NECA would be implemented in the North Sea or in the North Sea and the 
Baltic Sea from 2021 and onwards. From our analysis the average benefit-
cost ratio would be 5.7 (1.6-12) for the North Sea NECA and 5.2 (1.5-11) 
for NECA in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. The benefits are less clear 
for a NECA in only the Baltic Sea, with an average B/C ratio of 1.5 (0.5-
2.9). The most important source of variations in the B/C ratio is the value 
used for expressing value of avoided mortality.   
LNG propulsion gives higher net socio-economic benefits but also larger 
variance due to climate change impacts 
Our results show that a large scale introduction of LNG propulsion engines 
would give higher net socio-economic benefit but with a larger variation in 
B/C ratios than for conventional technologies. The B/C ratio in 2030 is 13.5 
(0.2-43.1), with 24 out of 27of the calculations giving B/C ratios larger than 
1. As for the conventional technologies, these results are sensitive to the 
value used for expressing value of avoided mortality, but they are also 
sensitive to the size and economic value of climate change impacts caused 
by SLCP emission changes and methane slip from the engines. If methane 
slip would become lower than what is currently estimated, most of the 
climate change impacts would disappear. 
Cost effectiveness of reducing emissions increases with technology 
utilization 
Another interesting aspect excluded from the final version of paper I is how 
the unit cost of emission control is affected by the number of hours per year 
that the technology is used. This is an aspect traditionally not focused on 
when analysing costs of reducing emissions from stationary sources for 
natural reasons (stationary sources don’t move in and out of emission 
control areas). This aspect is however relevant for NECA since a fair 
amount of the ships that would be affected spend a limited time each year in 
the North Sea and Baltic Sea. In our main analysis we saw that unit control 
costs were highest for NECA in BAS, followed by NECA in NSE and 
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BAS+NSE. In a sensitivity analysis we analysed the hypothetical situation 
in which all the ships would use the control technology for all hours of the 
year (approximately 5500 hours at sea per year). This situation corresponds 
to either a lower number of ships taking care of all the transport demand in 
the sea regions, or that NECA would be implemented world-wide. The 
average B/C ratio in the sensitivity analysis was 2.9 (1-5.3), 8.3 (2.7-15.2), 
6.6 (2.2-12.1) for the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and the Baltic + North Sea 
respectively.   
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from Paper II.  
SO2 policy instruments explains at least 26-27% of SO2 emission 
decoupling from economic growth in Sweden 1990-2012 
The decomposition analysis and qualitative literature overview show that 
SO2 policy instruments through their impact on fuel-related emission factors 
and through the installation of a scrubber in one cement production plant 
was responsible for 26-27% of the decoupling of SO2 emissions from 
economic growth. These 26-27% of the decoupling corresponds to 58% of 
the emission reduction 1990-2012, but are nevertheless underestimations of 
the impacts of SO2 policy instruments on SO2 emissions. Of the other 
driving forces of decoupling, structural changes explain 43% of the 
decoupling, fuel mix changes 18%, increased productivity 7%, and 
confounded emission factor changes 6%. 
Only 5-6% of the national decoupling of SO2 emissions from economic 
growth can be satisfactory explained by individual SO2 policy instruments 
Identification of individual policy instrument impacts is important if one 
wants to learn from experience prior to suggesting new or stricter SO2 
policy instruments. Despite the fact that we can identify that at least 26-27% 
of the decoupling was due to SO2 policy instruments, it is rarely possible to 
identify the impact of individual SO2 policy instruments. With the data and 
methods available the only non-confounding individual SO2 policy 
instruments we can find is the 1996 environmental court ruling to force 
installation of a scrubber in a cement production plant reduced and the 2007 
& 2010 reduction in emission limit values for marine oils. The scrubber 
installation explains 5-5.8 ktonne (~4% of the decoupling) and the marine 
oil restriction explains another 0.7-1 ktonne (~1% of the decoupling).  
Confounding factors inhibits impact analysis of individual SO2 policy 
instruments 
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The failure to identify effects of most individual SO2 policy instruments has 
several explanations. For energy sector emission factor changes the most 
important explanations are that: 1) many overlapping individual policy 
instruments were implemented during the period, potentially leading to spill 
over effects and confounding effects; 2) the typology of fuels and subsectors 
used in emission inventory in part differs from the classification used in 
legislative documents; 3) data on age and size of individual plants have not 
been collected in the emission inventory, neither were fuel price data 
collected for the fuel classes; 4) information about national legislation 
procedures (year of inception, announcement, and implementation), local 
requirements, and investment in SO2 emission reduction options has not 
been collected in the emission inventory; 5) there is a lack of knowledge 
about to what extent industrial actors respond to foreseeable individual 
instruments before they are implemented.  
For the industry sector the analysis was constrained by the available data 
being aggregated and the lack of accessible compilations of official data on 
environmental permit decisions. The analysis was also constrained by 
changes in: 1) size of industrial plants; 2) product assortments; 3) use of 
recycled materials; and 4) use of process chemicals. All of these co-
developed with SO2 policy instruments and can have had an impact on both 
emission factors and productivity.   
Furthermore, over the period, there were a number of events that could have 
impacts on national SO2 emissions but which we had no possibility to 
include, since they were too diverse and varying for a comprehensive 
analysis in this paper. Such events include: local voluntary agreements, 
informative policy instrument initiatives, outcomes from research and 
development (R&D) policies (Söderholm and Bergquist 2012), and 
autonomous changes in relative prices of fuels (Schmalensee and Stavins 
2013). Neither could we quantify the impact of active engagement in 
developing international environmental policy. 
 
5.2. Validity of results 
5.2.1. Validity of the CBA results (paper I) 
Given that the NECA CBA study is based on scenario analysis the results 
are sensitive to the baseline scenario used. We used previously published 
estimates on projected transport demand from Kalli, Jalkanen et al. (2013) 
as basis, but the future transport demand is nevertheless uncertain. 
However, although a different scenario might change the absolute level of 
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costs and benefits, the ratio between costs and benefits doesn’t need to be 
significantly affected.  
Another important part of the scenario analysis is that we assumed that there 
will be no change in ship vintage as response to NECA (which applies to 
new ships built after 31
st
 of December 2020). It could be discussed that a 
policy instrument that only affects technology built after a certain date will 
lead to a ‘building boom’ before the date of implementation. In our case this 
would imply an increase in ship constructions during 2018-2020. 
Alternatively, one could discuss the risk that ship owners would choose to 
re-allocate their older vessels to the Baltic and North Seas in response to the 
NECA. In our study we were not able to take these potential ‘announcement 
effect’ dynamics into account due to the low availability of knowledge 
about the phenomena. 
We also assumed that there will be no shift of transport demand from 
shipping to land based transport as a response to NECA. In other words, we 
assumed that the NECA would only imply marginal changes to the transport 
system too small for any modal shifts to occur.  
Nevertheless, on a balance, costs and benefits were underestimated. The 
study did not include the potential for learning effects that would reduce the 
control costs of emissions. Neither did it include several monetary benefits 
of emission reductions that would have increased the benefits of emission 
reductions if included. We therefore consider the results as underestimations 
of the net socio-economic benefit of NECA in the Baltic Sea and the North 
Sea. 
Finally, when comparing the parts of our CBA NECA results that are 
comparable to other studies we find that they are relatively well aligned. In 
our baseline scenario NOx emissions from the Baltic Sea and North Sea are 
748 ktonne NOx in 2030, which is somewhat lower than in Jonson, Jalkanen 
et al. (2014) (935 ktonne) and Kalli (2013) (840 ktonne). In our NECA 
scenario the 2030 NOx emissions decrease to 554 ktonne (~26% reduction). 
In Kalli (2013), a NECA would give an emission reduction of 640 ktonne 
(~25% reduction). Our unit control costs range between ~1440 - ~2800 
€2010/tonne NOx dependent on scenario. Campling, Janssen et al. (2013) 
estimate unit control costs to ~660 €2010/tonne NOx, and DEPA (2012) & 
Hammingh, Holland et al. (2012) estimate costs to ~890 - ~2910 €2010/tonne 
NOx. HELCOM (2012) estimate costs to ~1 470-2 060 €2010/tonne NOx. 
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5.2.2. Validity of the results from the decomposition 
analysis (paper II) 
Data estimates are always uncertain, and some of the reported changes in 
emissions and emission factors between years can be due to statistical 
errors. For 2012, the estimated combined uncertainty in national SO2 
emissions is 11%, but ranging between 13 to 74% for individual sectors 
(Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 2014).   
We show that ~32% of decoupling was due to reduced emission factors, 
which is relatively well aligned with previous studies. Rafaj, Amann et al. 
(2014) show that SO2 control gave ~22% of the decoupling of SO2 
emissions from economic growth in western Europe for the period 1960-
2010, and Rafaj, Amann et al. (2014) show that SO2 controls gave ~30% of 
the decoupling in EU-15 countries for the period 2000-2010. By only 
considering changes in emission factors as impacts of SO2 policy 
instruments we are most likely underestimating the impact of these 
instruments.  
Shortcomings of the decomposition analysis  
In the literature – and in paper II – there is little discussion about the fact 
that it is presumed that the driving forces develop over time independent of 
each other, in other words the ceteris paribus condition of many economic 
analyses is allowed to be implemented on chronological and historical data. 
A typical quote comes from Stern (2002), “A 1% increase in non-
manufacturing industrial output increases sulfur emissions by 0.083% if 
total output and total energy input and energy mix is held constant.”. The 
use of ceteris paribus-conditions on historical data is an example of a 
reductionist approach and further method development is motivated. One 
clear example is that economic growth is assumed independent of structural 
changes in the economy. However, to use the ceteris paribus condition to 
analyse potential future impacts of policy instruments can still be motivated. 
But in historical data we know the changes that occurred, so to assume away 
them by forcing the temporal ceteris paribus condition onto the analysis of 
historical data should reduce the validity of the results from a 
decomposition analysis. 
 
Furthermore, given that decomposition analysis doesn’t specify causality 
between emission drivers and SO2 policy instruments, we have to satisfy 
with the notion that SO2 policy instruments at least affected emission factors 
in energy and transport but nothing more, while it is plausible that SO2 
policy instruments had a combined impact on emission driving forces. 
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Theory and method to analyse this combined impact on historical data still 
needs to be developed.  
 
Finally, our decomposition analysis was a counterfactual analysis. Many 
environmental policies, including Swedish SO2 policies, don’t easily allow 
for the preferable experimental or quasi-experimental counterfactual 
analysis methods for policy impact evaluations. This is partly due to the 
national scale of the policies (which omits the use of control groups) but 
also due to the fact that need for policy impact evaluations isn’t considered 
when designing the policies (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
1997). Nevertheless counterfactual thinking helps guide the design of 
decomposition analysis and the identification of potential causal drivers of 
emissions. Counterfactual analysis is therefore deemed as a necessary tool 
for environmental policy evaluation to ensure that potential impacts of other 
confounding factors can be considered when analysing the effect of a policy 
intervention (Ferraro 2009). 
 
5.3. Scientific contribution to air pollution CBA 
With the research presented in this thesis we add to current knowledge 
mainly in two ways. First we collate the knowledge about options available 
to reduce air pollution emissions from international shipping. We present 
new data on emission control costs and analyse the net socio-economic 
benefits for Europe of reducing emissions from international shipping. The 
data is clearly presented and easily available to build upon by other 
researchers. Secondly we analyse to what extent air pollution emission 
reductions can be considered contingent or independent of air pollution 
policies and other policy developments. In this work we have also been able 
to analyse the link between actual policy decisions to actual emission 
reductions, thereby adding another level of understanding on how effective 
policy instruments are at reducing emissions. 
Of interest for air pollution CBA models is that paper I show that there are 
more options available with favourable B/C ratios than the options currently 
considered in the decision support material used by the EC. Paper II shows 
that it is still relevant to analyse costs of air pollution control in relation to 
air pollution benefits as stand-alone from other drivers of emission 
reductions (i.e. ‘air pollution control only’ scenarios). Even though direct air 
pollution control is not responsible for all available emission reductions, the 
impact has been large enough, despite co-existing ambitious CO2 policies, 
to support separate analysis and should be considered to still be large 
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enough in the future, especially for countries that have been less ambitious 
than Sweden in the past. 
With respect to robustness of current air pollution CBA the results from 
paper I indicate that the current approach could add more options in the 
analysis so as to increase robustness of analysis. With the B/C ratios of NOx 
emission reductions found in Paper I it is reasonable to assume that 
emission reductions from international shipping would be competitive with 
emission reductions from land-based sources. Including these options 
should change both the cost effective strategy as well as the cost efficient 
solution of CBA.  
The results from paper II gives an indication that the current consideration 
of only end-of-pipe emission control options in air pollution CBA models is 
relatively robust. SO2 instruments aimed at end-of-pipe emission control 
were influential in reducing Swedish emissions of SO2 1990-2012, despite 
previous large emission reductions, influence from climate policies, as well 
as a method that reduce the importance of SO2 end-of-pipe control. Given 
that Sweden was an early mover on SO2 control it should be possible to 
extrapolate this indication to other countries. However, it is not certain that 
the indications can be extrapolated to other pollutants.    
 
5.4. Implications for air pollution policy 
The most important policy-relevant outcome of paper I is that a NECA in 
only the Baltic Sea wouldn’t necessarily give net socio-economic benefits, 
while it does for the North Sea. The main reasons for this is that many of the 
countries bordering the North Sea has a higher population density and that 
the ship traffic runs mainly close to the coast line in the North Sea while it 
runs in the middle of the Baltic sea as far away from any coast line as 
possible.  
The results from paper I support the recent IMO decision to accept the 
Baltic and North Seas as NECAs by the 1
st
 of January 2021 (IMO 2017), 
even though the most cost-efficient solution would have been to go for only 
a NECA in the North Sea. The relatively clear net socio-economic benefits 
of introducing a NECA in the Baltic and North seas, and the potential for 
even larger net benefits through the use of LNG propulsion gives good 
support to the decision.  
Paper II shows that dedicated control of SO2 still in 1990-2012 was 
important for the reduction of emissions. This despite the fact that SO2 
emissions already had declined from ~900 ktonne in 1970 (Broström, 
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Grennfelt et al. 1994) to 105 ktonne in 1990 and despite the fact that 
Sweden in 1991 introduced ambitious climate policies, including a CO2 tax 
for specified sectors (increasing from 33 to 110€2005 per tonne CO2 emitted 
between 1991-2010). This gives support for continued work with air quality 
policy, in contrast to allowing air pollution policy to be considered only as a 
part of climate policy. In an international comparison Sweden was early to 
reduce emissions, and the Swedish energy system was already in 1990 
relatively independent from sulphur rich fossil fuels thanks to nuclear power 
and hydro power. This should imply that European countries that haven’t 
reduced their emissions as much as Sweden and that still have a fossil fuel 
based energy system should still have a substantial potential to reduce SO2 
emissions through dedicated SO2 control. 
Of further interest is also the fact that dedicated emission control might 
serve as a safeguard for emission reductions. In our sensitivity analysis we 
could see that IF the fuel demand and fuel mix of the Swedish energy 
system had remained as it was in 1990, dedicated emission control would 
have reduced emissions from these fuels with 45 ktonne instead of the 31 
ktonne that would have been the case with a 2012 fuel demand and fuel 
mix.  
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6. An overview of the theoretical fundaments of air 
pollution economics 
Earlier in this thesis I have focused on presenting results from research that 
applies the currently used concept for air pollution CBA´s and discussed 
how this research affects the robustness of the current concept. In Chapter 6 
I move on to discussing the robustness of the theoretical foundations of the 
current concepts.  
The CEA´s and CBA´s of air pollution policies discussed in this thesis are 
both based on standard welfare economics as described in mainstream text 
books although rich in technical detail. Air pollution control costs for a 
specific policy target are calculated by varying the use of existing emission 
control technologies so as to minimising total control costs. The cost 
minimization considers technical constraints on applicability of 
technologies. Unit control costs are defined per control technology and 
contain information on investments and costs for operation & management, 
as well as potential impact on resource efficiency. Instead of calculating net 
present value of the control costs, the annualised cost is estimated taking 
into account interest rates and technical lifetime of technologies. Benefits of 
air pollution control are calculated by linking annual physical impacts on 
primarily human health to monetized values of these impacts. The economic 
values are derived through economic valuation studies and transferred to a 
European context through the benefit transfer method. As for the control 
costs, annualised benefits are calculated instead of net present value. The 
CBA then allows for identification of a cost-efficient emission level. To 
avoid over-generalisation of this discussion I will in this text call the 
economic methods and theories used in air pollution CEA´s and CBA´s 
presented in this thesis as ‘air pollution economics’, which to a large extent 
should be considered as a branch of welfare economics, which in turn is a 
branch of Economics as taught in mainstream economic text books. 
Some of the thinking and assumptions in standard welfare economics and 
CBA is controversial from an intellectual, ethical, as well as methodological 
stand-point and therefore deserves special attention in this thesis. I will go 
through some areas of debate that might affect the robustness of the results 
in air pollution economics. I am at this stage not able to draw conclusions 
on whether it is scientifically sound to use CBA results to derive air 
pollution policy ambition levels, but I hope to shed light on implicit and 
potentially controversial assumptions that underlies the economic decision 
support directed towards air pollution policy makers.   
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6.1. The basic assumptions of standard welfare 
economics 
Economics can be defined as:, “the study of how societies use scarce 
resources to produce valuable goods and services and distribute them 
among different individuals” (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2010). Welfare 
economics is the branch of economics in which welfare implications of 
policies are studied. The standard version of welfare economics is based on 
a market under perfect competition, in which profit-maximising producers, 
and utility maximising consumers operate.  
The prerequisites that define the market under perfect competition are:  
 Trade of homogenous (identical) products and services,  
 There are no transaction costs,  
 Both buyers and sellers have perfect information (everyone has full 
knowledge),  
 No single actor on the market can affect prices (there are only price 
takers),  
 Actors can enter or exit the market free of charge,  
 There is no price discrimination,  
 There are no externalities. 
The producers and the consumers have in welfare economics been assigned 
several characteristics. In addition to being profit maximisers (and cost 
minimizers) the producers experience increasing marginal costs of 
production and will produce as long as marginal production costs are not 
higher than the price for the product or service at the market (there is no 
economics of scale in production). The only way for any producer to 
increase profits is to be more effective than the other producers.  
The consumers choose a bundle of products and services from the market 
places so that the consumer’s utility from consumption is maximised given 
the consumer’s budget constraint. The consumers are characterised by the 
ability to:  
 Compare and rank alternative bundles of products and services 
(completeness of preferences) 
 Hold stable preferences for these bundles (reflexive preferences) 
 Have internally consistent preferences (transitive preferences) 
 Consider that more is better than less for any product and service, 
but at declining rate (preferences are strongly monotonic) 
 Substitute between different products and services (indifference). 
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Through these prerequisites and characteristics, trade on the market place 
for any good or service will lead to a price equal to the marginal cost of 
production for the product or service, and a welfare maximising equilibrium 
of price and quantity traded will have been reached.  
6.1.1. Common discussions around standard welfare 
economics 
The standard welfare economics’ description of the economy has been 
discussed for years. Some of the discussion has been focused on issues of 
general importance while other discussion has been based on specific details 
of the prerequisites and characteristics presented above. I present two 
discussions of general importance and follow up with some of the 
discussions around the assumption of the market under perfect competition 
and the rational consumer. The assumed behaviour of the producer in the 
market economy will not be specifically discussed.   
Is equilibrium analysis always suitable for studies of the 
economy? 
As presented, the models of standard welfare economics assume that the 
market and the economy strive towards equilibrium, a motion driven by 
negative feedback mechanisms in the economy. Equilibrium thinking as a 
way to describe the ideal market origins from the fact that economists 
started to use equilibrium math, presumably due to the land winnings of 
equilibrium physics at the time (Beinhocker 2006). The discipline of 
physics has since then moved on, but much economic analysis has stuck 
with the assumption that the market strives towards equilibrium. This 
assumption has been criticized as being too simplistic and not properly 
representing observed behaviour at the market of for example financial 
products, or being able to help explain issues such as unemployment, 
innovation, the emergence of new technologies (which can be affected by 
positive feedbacks), or transitions in the economy etc.  (Beinhocker 2006, 
Quiggin 2010, Schlefer 2012, Arthur 2014, Stiglitz 2015).  
It should also be noted that even if equilibrium would be a valid assumption, 
game theorists have shown how market rationality in certain cases might 
provide equilibrium solutions that are not giving the most beneficial 
solution for society as a whole, such as Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951, The 
Economist 2016). These studies and proofs are often made in situations that 
don’t share the prerequisites of the market under perfect competition but 
still deserve attention here for the reason that real life markets also doesn’t 
share many of the prerequisites of the market under perfect competition. 
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Should one use market rationality in other arenas of decision 
making? 
Despite the fact that at least one of the original thinkers considered 
economics only to apply to the market place (Mill 1836), much of the 
current economic analysis assume that rational behaviour at the market can 
be transferred to other social interactions as well as interactions with nature. 
Economics is no longer just a science of rational behaviour at the market 
place, but is now also applied to studying many types of decision making 
and making policy recommendations in several different arenas. According 
to Metcalf (2017) this shift of focus was pushed by the work of Friedrich 
Hayek in the 1930´s and Milton Friedman in the 1970´s. It is today often 
assumed that the prerequisites of the market and the characteristics of the 
agents on the market can guide decisions that lead to good management of 
nature and society. A pertinent example is air pollution economics, which 
often includes economic valuation of human health and environmental 
impacts, but also has been used to support creation of markets (such as SO2 
emissions trading) and adjustments of existing markets (such as SO2 tax).  
Is the market under perfect competition too far away from 
reality? 
The market under perfect competition is an idealised model of actual 
markets. It is clear to most that all the prerequisites are rarely met in reality, 
and the markets that come closest are the markets for some very basic 
products such as wheat (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2010). Within academia 
there is a large body of research exploring several types of exemptions from 
the basic prerequisites of the market under perfect competition. Some 
influential areas of research are research on how the equilibrium solution is 
affected by imperfect information (Akerlof 1970, Stiglitz 2001), the 
existence of externalities such as air pollution (Ayres and Kneese 1969, 
Kolstad 2000), or when not all agents are price takers (monopolies, 
oligopolies, monopsonies, cartels etc.). The real life existence of imperfect 
information, externalities, and agents having price setting abilities shifts the 
equilibrium solution of welfare economics. However, in much applied 
research, most of the basic prerequisites are still used (Gowdy 2004), which 
in turn could have impacts on policy recommendations from applied 
research.  
The many ways the theoretical consumer differs from a human 
The behaviour of the consumer in standard welfare economics has been 
discussed for decades and with much input from other academic disciplines 
studying human behaviour, such as psychology. One of the controversies 
regards the moral of this consumer, who appears to be more egoistic and 
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hedonistic than normal humans. The consumer in welfare economics is 
supposed to make decisions that maximise his own utility (but might still to 
an unknown extent derive utility from the wellbeing of others (Pearce 
1998)). This controversy has been led on by quotes from influential thinkers 
like Adam Smith (1776): “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest” and F.Y. Edgeworth 1881 (quoted in Sen (1977)): “The 
first principle of economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-
interest”. Experiments have shown that actual behaviour of humans is 
explained also by other principles than pure self-interest. Examples are 
concern for fairness (Berg 1995, Engelmann and Strobel 2004) and norms 
of cooperation (Fischbacher, Gächter et al. 2001, Herrmann, Thöni et al. 
2008). The behaviour of humans is also often driven by simplified reasoning 
(Kahneman, Slovic et al. 1983, Kahneman 2011) and includes several 
different types of irrational (for the consumer) biases, such as status que 
bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). The utility maximisation of the 
consumer is also questionable. The prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1992) shows (inter alia) how humans 
evaluate gambles by comparing the outcome with a given reference point 
rather than comparing it with the total size of the expected reward. It is also 
noteworthy that the consumer in standard welfare economics appears to 
have an analytical capacity far beyond any human (Thaler 2000).    
6.1.2. Assessing how these discussions might affect 
the reliability of air pollution economics  
Air pollution economics is to a large extent building upon the standard 
welfare economic definitions of trade at the market place and the behaviour 
of the consumer and producer as presented in mainstream economic text 
books. The main exception is that negative externalities cause by air 
pollution is included in the CBA´s. Therefore, by using results from air 
pollution economics one takes the underlying assumptions as acceptable for 
the analysis. But when many of the assumptions of standard welfare 
economics are questioned it might be the case that the results from air 
pollution economics are questionable too. I will therefore discuss some 
potential impacts on air pollution economics based on the overview 
presented above.  
Is air pollution economics in equilibrium? 
First of all, air pollution economics relies on equilibrium thinking around 
the market of air pollution control and the fact that market thinking provides 
good guidance for air pollution management. Issues that might lead the ‘air 
pollution market’ off equilibrium might be new technologies or other ways 
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to reduce emissions, which are rarely included in the analysis. One 
relatively new technology that appears to be contributing to some parts of a 
potential large technology transition is the technology used to meet the 
latest emission standard for control of air pollution from personal cars (Euro 
6). Measurements of NOx emissions from personal cars with diesel engines 
in actual driving conditions have often shown that emissions from real 
driving are higher than allowed laboratory values for several Euro standards 
(Weiss, Bonnel et al. 2012, Lee, Park et al. 2013). In some cases the 
divergence has been achieved through advanced cheating of the lab tests, as 
in the Volkswagen Dieselgate. In other cases it has been achieved through 
optimizing the engine performance so as to fit the lab requirements (cycle 
beating). The divergence, in combination with Dieselgate, and a 
corresponding problem with CO2 (Ntziachristos, Mellios et al. 2014) might 
have spawned a future technology transition. Several European cities are 
now considering banning diesel-fuelled personal cars and companies 
considers stopping investment in research and development on diesel 
engines. These changes (if implemented) could qualify the market for air 
pollution control of emissions from vehicles to be characterised by positive 
rather than negative feedbacks. This would in turn render the standard 
equilibrium thinking used in current air pollution economics less reliable for 
this particular market.  
The market in air pollution economics  
In current air pollution CEA´s it is assumed that a market under perfect 
competition exists for the control technologies. All countries are assumed to 
have access to all control technologies at identical level of investment 
(implying insignificant transaction costs and perfect information). The 
critique against the perfect information assumption in standard welfare 
economics might be less pertinent in air pollution economics. The reason for 
this is that the EU and Air Convention are identifying and documenting 
technologies and their costs in the Best Available Technology Reference 
(BAT/BREF) documentation that is part of air pollution policies. However, 
as in standard welfare economics there is no learning or economics of scale 
in the CEA´s of air pollution economics. The critique against the ‘no 
externalities’ assumption is not applicable to air pollution economics since it 
per definition studies a market for externalities. But part from the efforts to 
improve the information availability and inclusion of air pollution 
externalities, the market for clean air in air pollution economics functions as 
in standard welfare economics.  
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The producer in air pollution economics 
The producers of clean air have the same characteristics as the producers in 
standard welfare economics. In air pollution economics competition 
between producers isn’t specifically considered but indications of these 
features are seen in the fact that control costs (investment + operation & 
management costs) for each technology is fixed, although with slight 
national variance of operation and management costs dependent on salary 
levels. The potential producers of clean air are to be found all over society 
and the optimal choice of control is based purely on cost of the technology. 
In reality though, time and risk preferences might differ between 
governments, firms, and private households. These differences might have 
an impact on the allocation of emission control efforts, an aspect that needs 
further research.  
The consumer in air pollution economics 
As in standard welfare economics, the consumer in air pollution economics 
is able to substitute demand for a service (in this case clean air) for money. 
The demand function used by the EU for clean air (the horizontal benefit 
lines in Figure 1) is the same as in the standard welfare economics except 
for the fact that it (in its current shape) doesn’t support strongly monotonic 
preferences. More research is needed on how thresholds of human health 
and environmental impacts might affect the demand function, and on how 
the consumer in air pollution economics differs from humans, and what the 
implications are of these differences.   
 
6.2. Discussions about CBA 
Having established that current air pollution economics accept most of the 
basics of welfare economics, one can move on to a more CBA-specific 
discussion. It should be mentioned however, that much of the criticism of 
CBA does not accept the above presented principles, as in much of the 
criticism presented by Heinzerling and Ackerman (2002). 
To weight costs versus benefits prior to making decisions feels intuitively 
reasonable and is quite often an activity that many of us engage in in 
everyday life. A cost-efficient solution, in which the marginal costs of 
reducing emissions of air pollution are equal to the marginal benefits, is in 
principle also easy to defend. Any higher effort would cost more than it 
gives back. In a resource constraint world, ensuring that the policy 
initiatives with highest cost-efficiency are promoted makes sense. Currently, 
the main tool available to analyse cost-efficiency of environmental policy is 
CBA. In the paragraphs below I present the most commonly occurring 
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discussions about and criticisms towards CBA. I start with the discussions 
that to some extent affects both welfare economics in general and CBA in 
particular. As with the criticism towards economics in general it is still 
unclear how much of the criticism towards CBA that is applicable to air 
pollution CBA. 
6.2.1. Main issues of concern for CBA 
The challenges with monetization 
A CBA involving impacts on goods and services not traded on markets 
requires monetization of these impacts. Monetization is the practice of 
identifying our preferences for non-market goods or services, most often 
through experiments. The ethical foundation and the methods used for 
monetization are all subject to discussion (Pearce 1998, Frank 2000, Hanley 
2001).  
One topic for discussion is that the there is a limit to how easily 
environmental goods and services can be substituted for money, and how 
such a substitution can be morally justified. As clarifying examples of this 
controversy one could consider our willingness to accept monetary 
compensation for the re-instatement of hanging, or disallowing women from 
voting in public elections (Holland 1996). In short, CBA relies on the 
questionable ethical stand point that everything can be traded (Hanley 2001) 
and is sometimes considered as a bit too cynical as discussed by Pearce 
(1998). Alternatively people might have lexical preferences, i.e. not 
allowing for substitution between financial costs and degradation of human 
health and the environment (Pearce 1998), as expressed by Heinzerling and 
Ackerman (2002) when claiming that a CBA cannot be done due to the 
sanctity of human life. The existence of lexical preferences might be one 
reason to the often rather high rate of protest bids in valuation studies.  
However, decisions in society sometimes involve decisions on how many 
lives to save, thereby implicitly pricing the value of avoided mortality (since 
saving lives often comes at a cost). Examples are considerations of which 
health care system to have, which roads to build, which safety requirements 
to put on air planes etc. So even though it can appear morally questionable, 
economic valuation of human life currently appears to be desirable for 
social planners.  
Another type of ethical criticism is that valuation studies might invoke ones 
self-interest while people in their day-to-day decisions care for other people 
as well (Heinzerling and Ackerman 2002). This concern is corroborated in 
experiments where priming subjects on money creates a context that 
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promote self-oriented thinking. The subjects primed to money behaved in 
ways that made them “free of dependency and dependents” (Vohs, Mead et 
al. 2006, Bowles 2008). It is however not clarified to what extent altruistic 
ideas and concern for others are included in monetary evaluation of non-
market goods and services (Pearce 1998), but it has been shown that persons 
with altruistic value orientations assign higher willingness to pay for 
wildlife preservation than persons with egoistic value orientations (Ojea and 
Loureiro 2007).  
The methods used in valuation studies are often considered problematic 
(Pearce 1998). One issue for discussion is what valuation studies actually 
measure. Sagoff (1994) for example argues that the efforts to identify our 
preferences (through valuation studies) are misguided approximations of 
utility since preferences not necessarily represents values. A similar 
discussion relates to the fact that our values for environmental goods and 
services might be more closely linked to our ideals rather than our consumer 
preferences. If so, the results from valuation studies (despite their name) 
might give poor metrics of the value the subjects put on environmental 
goods and services (Holland 1996, Bowles 2008). 
On a more detailed methodological level there are discussions on the subject 
sample as well as problems with comparing costs and benefits. One example 
is that most preference studies often are sampled based on Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic (WEIRD) people (i.e. students 
at European and U.S. universities). The values of WEIRD people are often 
not representative of the general population (Henrich, Heine et al. 2010). It 
is also not sure that voting behaviour is similar to real-life purchase 
behaviour (Heinzerling and Ackerman 2002). Much of this discussion might 
imply that one of the work horses of environmental valuation, the 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) would give unreliable results. 
Another issue of concern with the practice of CBA is that valuation seems 
to be context dependent (value of one week of extra vacation is less 
sensitive to positional effects than value of extra salary (Frank 2000)). 
Furthermore, the existence of positional goods – with purchase values not 
allowing for aggregation into social welfare estimates – causes contextual 
problems in a CBA if costs of these goods (e.g. a new clean car) are 
compared with environmental non-positional benefits (e.g. cleaner air) 
(Jaeger 1995).  
It is not only benefits that are difficult to monetize. Experience show that 
data on costs for emission control often are over-estimated (Jaeger 1995, 
Heinzerling and Ackerman 2002, Oosterhuis, Monier et al. 2006, Simpson 
2014, Chemsec 2015). And projections of future costs require assumptions 
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on inter alia the rate of technical change, an assumption that often is 
influential to the results (Ackerman, DeCanio et al. 2009). 
CBA-specific concerns 
There are six main concerns that more directly relates only to CBA, 
distributional issues, the use of discounting, benefit transfer, treatment of 
uncertainty, the static nature of most CBA, and undue influence from 
stakeholders. There are more, but the ones I’ve excluded are more general in 
their nature. One example of such excluded critique is the critique claiming 
that CBA is a black box, a critique shared by most modelling efforts.   
Distributional issues 
The results of CBA are rarely showing impacts on distribution of costs and 
benefits (Pearce 1998, Hanley 2001, Heinzerling and Ackerman 2002, 
Frank 2008). The cost efficient solution is not affected by the distribution of 
wins and losses, but is satisfied with the fact that there is a potential for the 
winner to compensate the looser, a position defended by the Kaldor-Hicks 
potential Pareto improvement criteria. 
The use of discounting 
Most CBA´s use discounting of future events to enable comparison of costs 
and benefits occurring today with costs and benefits occurring in the future. 
Recommended values for the discount rates are often considered as 
dependent on whether the project is a public or private project, which risk 
perspective to have, and is often affected by the method used to derive it. 
Values in the literature range from 0.1% per year (Stern 2006a) up to 9% 
(Harrison 2010), with the most common values ranging between 3 – 6 % 
(Moore, Boardman et al. 2004, Godard 2009, Moore, Boardman et al. 
2013). The use of discounting, and the discount rate chosen, often has a 
large impact on the results of a CBA. This is especially evident in CBA´s 
related to climate change, where impacts several centuries in the future are 
analysed (Frank 2000, Hanley 2001, Adler 2002). There has been much 
debate about which discount rate that is suitable for climate change CBA, 
and the low discount rate in Stern (2006b) was subject to criticism and 
discussion (Nordhaus 2007, Weitzman 2007, Sterner and Persson 2008). 
The use of discounting is mainly justified by: the assumption that future 
generations are expected to be wealthier than current generations; that 
people (in experiments) express time discounting preferences (pure rate of 
time preferences); and the fact that money has an opportunity cost (Harrison 
2010). However, the use of discounting can also be seen as poor inter-
generational justice, since the impacts of future generations is given less 
importance than current generations. Others, (Heinzerling and Ackerman 
2002) discards the use of discounting to do trade-offs between financial and 
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non-financial (read environmental) costs. The currently preferred academic 
approach to discount rate issues - to a large extent based on experiments and 
surveys - is to use hyperbolic discounting. Hyperbolic discounting implies 
rather high discount rates for near term impacts and then continuously 
lowering them in the future (Weitzman 1998, Grijalva, Lusk et al. 2013). 
Hyperbolic discounting has it opponents claiming that hyperbolic 
discounting leads to time inconsistent choices (Laibson 1997, Winkler 
2006), a critique that is in turn criticized by others (Hansen 2006). Another 
proposed solution has been to use lower discount rates for environmental 
benefits than for financial costs (Horowitz 1996).  
Benefit transfer 
Most large scale CBAs require the use of meta-data, and monetized values 
of environmental goods and services are derived through the benefit transfer 
method (Hanley 2001, Boyle, Parmeter et al. 2013). Benefit transfer might 
imply risks of over-generalisation and lack of consideration of socio-
cultural differences between populations (Hynes, Norton et al. 2012) as well 
as socio-economic differences.  
Uncertainty 
CBA is criticized for not sufficiently taking into account the uncertainty of 
policy outcomes (Hanley 2001), a critique that should be common for many 
decision support tools. One other type of omitted uncertainty is uncertainty 
in effects on the considered externalities (like health and environmental 
impacts). Another important aspect of uncertainty is that many impacts are 
not monetized at all (Adler 2002, Heinzerling and Ackerman 2002).  
Static analysis 
CBA is most often static and does not include dynamic effects such as 
cumulative and indirect environmental effects of policy initiatives (Hanley 
2001) as well as market dynamic effects (Heinzerling and Ackerman 2002, 
Ackerman, DeCanio et al. 2009). Closely related to the critique of CBA 
being static is the critique of using CBA for analysing policies that leads to 
large scale changes, which would change the dynamics of the system 
analysed. One such type of intervention would be ambitious climate policies 
that might change the structure of society. Environmental economics (a sub-
branch of welfare economics) and CBA is by many considered as developed 
to study marginal changes (the last litre of clean water on the planet is never 
valued
1
), so the larger the intervention the larger the risk that CBA results 
                                                          
1 This nuance is one of the key differences between the field of environmental economics and 
ecological economics. In ecological economics there is valuation of the last litre of clean 
water (Costanza, R., R. D'Arge, R. de Groot, S. Farber, M. Grasso, B. Hannon, K. Limburg, 
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would be invalid. This was one of the criticisms directed against the Stern 
Review (Stern 2006a), and it also relates to the earlier discussion on 
equilibrium.   
Undue influence from stakeholders on CBA results 
CBA has also received critique for not promoting social welfare (Adler 
2002). One main driver of this is that some stakeholders can be suspected to 
have unduly impact on the results from a CBA. Yet again a critique that 
should be common for most decision support analysis.   
6.2.2. Proposed CBA method developments 
There are proposals to further develop CBA. Some of the attempts include: 
Extended CBA (Holland, Hurley et al. 2005), allowing for inclusion of non-
quantified aspects, and the very similar Qualitative CBA (van den Bergh 
2004) which could enable consideration of the precautionary principle. 
Other suggestions for developments have been to perform dynamic CBA´s, 
basically linking more or less advanced equilibrium models to CBA 
(Kriström and Bonta Bergman 2014), or CBA based on behavioural 
economics (Gowdy 2004). However, it appears as if the internal theoretical 
(and philosophical) consistency of these merged concepts still needs to be 
evaluated.  
 
6.3. Assumptions and limitations in the CBA made for 
the EC 
As mentioned earlier it is still not clarified which parts of the critiques and 
discussions around economics as a discipline and CBA as a method that is 
applicable to air pollution CBA. However, there are a number of 
assumptions and limitations to the air pollution CBA used for CAPP that 
can be identified.  
With respect to the geographical scope of the CBA it is worth noticing that 
benefits occurring outside the EU are disregarded when identifying cost-
efficient emission levels (Holland 2014). Due to the transboundary nature of 
air pollution the EC initiatives will have positive impacts on the rest of 
Europe but this is not taken into account in the EC CBA.  
                                                                                                                                       
S. Naeem, R. V. O'Neill, J. Paruelo, R. G. Raskin, P. Sutton and M. van den Belt (1997). 
"The value of the world's ecosystem services and natural capital." Nature 387, Costanza, R., 
R. de Groot, P. Sutton, S. van der Ploeg, S. J. Anderson, I. Kubiszewski, S. Farber and R. K. 
Turner (2014). "Changes in the global value of ecosystem services." Global Environmental 
Change 26: 152-158.)  
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The benefit part of the CBA does not include all of the known impacts of air 
pollution on human health and the environment. Some of the omitted 
impacts are air pollution impacts on prevalence of diabetes, skin aging as 
well as premature birth and gestational weight (Thurston, Kipen et al. 2017). 
Furthermore, the recent recommendations to include mortality impacts from 
to exposure to NO2 (Raaschou-Nielsen, Jovanovic Andersen et al. 2012, 
Faustini, Rapp et al. 2014, Heroux, Anderson et al. 2015) is not considered 
in the analysis. Other omitted values are values of ecosystem damages 
caused by air pollution such as acidification, eutrophication, forest growth 
damages and reduced biodiversity (Holland, Maas et al. 2015). There are 
also several control options that are not included in the cost part of the 
CBA. GHG emission control options are not included (but controlled for in 
extra scenario analyses (IIASA 2014)). Other omitted options include 
behavioural changes, scrapping of old technologies, and emission reduction 
from international shipping.  
Instead of calculating net present values, control costs and benefits are 
annualised. Annualisation implies the assumption that costs and benefits of 
air pollution control will be homogenous in their distribution over time. The 
CBA is calculated for a target year instead of being based on calculated net 
present values of costs and benefits. All costs and benefits are calculated 
with real monetary values (Currently € at 2005 value). Costs are calculated 
using a social planner perspective on control costs (4% interest rate on 
investment, technical lifetime of technology for the annualisation). The 
assumption of homogenous distribution over time becomes less important 
since the CBA choose a zero discount rate for the monetary values of 
human health and ecosystem impacts (Desaigues, Ami et al. 2011).  
In the benefit part of the air pollution CBA, the monetary values used to 
estimate health impacts is based on benefit transfer and is identical 
regardless of which EU country the impact occurred in (Holland 2014). In 
this respect, the analysis promotes equality between all EU member states. 
To ensure compliance with state-of-the-art, guidelines for benefit transfer of 
the values of non-market goods and services of relevance for air pollution 
policy has been developed (Pearce 2000). The values on mortality, which 
dominates the monetized benefits, is partly based on recent analysis 
presenting EU-average value of life years lost (VOLY) from air pollution. 
The EU average was based on results from valuation studies in nine EU 
countries (Desaigues, Ami et al. 2011). However, distributional issues of 
benefits between rich and poor within a country, or between producers and 
consumers, or between different sectors are not identified. 
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With respect to CBA most often being a static analysis it is worth 
mentioning that in the air pollution CBA used for CAPP, control costs are 
calculated as static and there is no learning from experience, so costs do not 
decrease over time or as a consequence of previous investments. Neither 
does the analysis allow for new technologies or system dynamics. Of 
relevance for air pollution would be how strategies to improve urban air 
quality can be intertwined with urban development plans and thereby have 
impacts on regional economic growth (Whitehead, Simmonds et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, control costs never disappear. There is always a ‘shadow cost/ 
opportunity cost’ of sort for low sulphur fuels for example, despite the fact 
that high sulphur fuels are no longer on the market in countries like Sweden. 
Another aspect that deserves mentioning is the fact that costs are usually 
considered so small that they will not cause any significant impact on 
economic development. In the analysis the control costs for additional air 
pollution control are at their max 0.3% of EU GDP in 2030, and ~0.03% for 
the cost-efficient emission levels (Amann, Borken-Kleefeld et al. 2014).  
To analyse potential distributional issues and impacts on economic growth 
the CBA used for CAPP was complemented with analysis using the GEM-
E
3
 model (Capros, Van Regemorter et al. 2013). The complementary 
analysis confirmed the reliability of the assumed low impact on economic 
development by showing an impact on GDP of ~-0.026% in 2030 compared 
to the reference scenario from the implementation of the cost-efficient 
emission level. Furthermore, the complementary analysis also showed small 
net impacts on employment in the EU (European Commission 2013, 
Vrontisi, Abrell et al. 2016).   
 
6.4. Other arguments for using CBA as decision 
support 
So far in chapter 6 I have presented common discussion and critique against 
CBA. However, there are a couple of non-scientific reasons to why CBA is 
promoted for policy support. Decision makers use economic analysis of 
policy proposals in general, and CBA of policy proposals in particular 
because: a) Economics is a discipline that studies humans and societies, 
which are affected by policy proposals (one of several disciplines); b) 
Economics and CBA are quantitative, allowing for the production of 
numbers useful for policy negotiations and targets; and c) Economics is a 
normative science, which enables decision makers to get an aid in 
identifying good and bad outcomes (albeit using a hedonistic moral code 
based on utilitarianism as guide).  
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In the literature there are also a number of less abstract reasons identified. 
The primary reason brought up for why CBA can be used is that better 
options are yet to be identified (Pearce 1998). In other words, results from a 
CBA should be considered as a best available estimate. It is also the case 
that the use of CBA is mandated for public sector planning and initiatives in 
many countries (Pearce 1998, Swedish Road Administration 2015). Also, 
the ambitions for social change are higher than the financial resources 
available, making it important to have a way to weight the net benefits of 
different policy initiatives against each other. Furthermore, striving for cost-
efficiency is a prudent way to handle tax payers’ money. Yet another reason 
is that policy initiatives – such as proposals for environmental policies – 
will have more types of impacts than only environmental, which renders 
environmental impact assessments insufficient. Another reason sometimes 
mentioned is that CBA allow for a more democratic decision making than 
expert opinions (Hanley 2001, Pearce, Atkinson et al. 2006) through the use 
of willingness to pay studies. This way of thinking can nevertheless be 
criticised since the interest of minorities might sometimes be more 
important (Holland 1996).  
However, even with these non-scientific arguments for why CBA can be 
used despite its shortcomings there are some reservations necessary to 
mention. First and foremost, economists who advocate the use of CBA still 
emphasise that CBA is preferable to other methods mainly when the policy 
objective is to achieve cost effectiveness. Furthermore, the same economists 
also stress the importance of viewing CBA as one of several decision 
support approaches that should be made prior to decisions.  
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7. Outlook 
With the papers presented in this thesis we have started to analyse whether 
results from the current approaches to air pollution CBA are robust. In this 
thesis I have also presented an overview of the fundaments of CBA and 
discussions surrounding these. In this outlook chapter I therefore present our 
ongoing studies as well as discuss the potential to add more fundamental 
knowledge to CBA.   
 
7.1. Our planned and ongoing studies relating to the 
robustness of current air pollution CBA 
In the applied part of the research we are currently analysing to what extent 
actor perspectives will have impacts on the perceived cost effectiveness of 
emission control. We compare the social planner perspective with a 
corporate perspective by altering the interest rate and lifetime of 
investments used to calculate annual costs of emission control and use the 
GAINS model to analyse cost effective emission control strategies. These 
results show if the emission control cost curve in air pollution CBA is 
robust (if the same control options are used) with respect to actor 
perspectives.  
Secondly we are analysing whether climate metrics used to illustrate the 
climate impacts of emissions of short lived climate pollutants (SLCP) has an 
impact on cost effective control of SLCP emissions. We calculate cost 
effectiveness of SLCP emission reduction for different climate metrics and 
compare cost effectiveness of the options as a function of climate metric 
used. These results show whether the emission control cost curve in air 
pollution CBA is robust with respect to climate metrics chosen. 
Third we will compare costs and effects of reducing emissions from land 
with costs and effects of reducing emissions from international shipping. 
This study use the GAINS model extended with data from paper I. The 
results from the study will show if the cost effective pollution control in the 
Nordic countries would include emission reductions from international 
shipping if that was added as an option.  
Fourth we will analyse to what extent unconventional control options such 
as non-technical measures and behavioural changes can be added to the 
portfolio of control options, thereby extending the control cost curve. We 
also aim to analyse to what extent these measures can be analysed in an 
IAM framework.  
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All of the above presented research activities are providing input to the 
robustness analysis of air pollution economics as it is currently applied. 
However, as presented in Chapter 6, robustness of the fundamental theory 
supporting air pollution economics also deserves analysis. For such 
analysis, the research activities and research questions are currently less 
clear, and there are many potential research directions.  
 
7.2. Potential ways forward for continuing the 
development the theoretical foundation in air 
pollution CBA 
The results from models used in air pollution economics of today present a 
hypothetical and constrained solution to how, where, and by how much 
emissions of air pollutants should be reduced. The models assume that the 
agents making investment decisions all base their decisions only on which 
solution that is cost effective. Furthermore the models assume an 
international market under perfect competition for emission control 
technologies and that all agents have perfect information. The available 
solutions are constrained to an assumed future economy largely unaffected 
by decisions made to control air pollution, and to established and well 
defined end-of-pipe emission control technologies that are not subject to any 
learning effects. The only benefits that matter for the emission levels are 
benefits that have been monetized and there are no thresholds or decrease in 
the marginal utility of cleaner air. Given all of the above (and many more 
scientific aspects) the models present to negotiators a potential solution that 
is both cost effective and cost efficient for society. 
As presented in chapter 6 there is critique against the economic theories that 
is the basis for air pollution economics and CBA. And there are modelling 
opportunities that in various ways relax the assumptions and constraints 
presented above which have not been taken up by the air pollution 
economics used to deliver decision support to negotiators. During my 
studies I have had the opportunity to study two alternative approaches to 
economics: Behavioural economics (Camerer, Loewenstein et al. 2004) and 
Complexity economics (Arthur 2013, Arthur 2014). Even though I will not 
present these approaches here, both are descriptive rather than normative 
and both use more realistic assumptions about how decisions are made than 
the standard approach to welfare economics and air pollution economics.  
Although both Behavioural economics and Complexity economics both fits 
better with observations and current understanding of decision making it is 
unclear how these disciplines can help develop air pollution economics 
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further. One of the first things that needs clarification is whether air 
pollution economics operates in an area of the economy that behaves as it is 
assumed in mainstream text books. Behavioural and complexity economics 
are both fields that by some of their proponents are considered to 
complement the standard theories of economics, not refute them. Camerer, 
Loewenstein et al. (2004) for example state that the expected utility 
hypothesis of standard economics “… is like Newtonian mechanics, which is 
useful for objects travelling at low velocities but mispredicts at high 
speeds.” and that the advancements of behavioural economics “… does not 
imply a wholesale rejection of the neoclassical approach to economics 
based on utility maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency.”. Similarly, 
Arthur (2014) express that “… certainly, many parts of the economy could 
still be treated as approximatively in equilibrium” and that “Equilibrium of 
course will remain a useful first-order approximation, useful for situations 
in economics that are well-defined, rationalizable, and reasonable static”. 
A potential overarching question of relevance then becomes: How do we 
know (can we know) if air pollution economics belongs to the part of 
the economy that can be treated as proposed by standard welfare 
economics and equilibrium thinking? 
If one would be able to answer this question it would give guidance to what 
the most urgent improvements of air pollution CBA are. Looking at the 
current focus of behavioural and complexity economics give little guidance. 
The applications of behavioural economics mostly involve savings, labour 
economics, and finance. And of relevance for environmental policy is the 
development of the nudging concept (Sunstein and Thaler 2008) which is 
(in an environmental context) primarily applied in policies aimed to 
encourage individuals to make rational decisions on energy use. The 
applications of complexity economics are rarer. Examples involves finance 
and technology innovation processes. However, the fact that these 
applications are not directly related to air pollution economics might just be 
a result of resource constraints in the research community.     
Another overarching question that it would be beneficial to clarify prior to 
developing new research is: Why hasn’t the state-of-the-art knowledge in 
economics been taken up (yet) by air pollution economics? As presented 
in this thesis, welfare economics have developed fairly advanced 
approaches to emission control and CBA, while air pollution CBA from an 
economic perspective might be perceived as rather rudimentary in some of 
its details. Examples includes that learning is excluded, that only end-of-
pipe emission controls are considered, and that marginal benefits of 
emission control is constant. The answer to this second question would have 
to consider inter alia the potential impact from active engagement of 
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stakeholders from governments, industrial stakeholders and NGO´s, as well 
as considering the computational modelling feasibility of air pollution 
IAM´s. 
Until these questions have been answered potential research focus could be 
to test and discuss the existing proposals for alternative air pollution CBA´s 
with respect to internal theoretical and philosophical consistency. In this 
thesis I have presented Extended CBA, Qualitative CBA, Dynamic CBA as 
well as CBA adjusted to behavioural economics. For policy support, it is 
also important to keep reminding decision makers that CBA is best used if 
the policy objective is to achieve cost effectiveness, and that CBA should be 
one of several types of analysis supporting policy analysis.  
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